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**EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION - UKRAINIAN
SECURITY OPTIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS**

by

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March 2005

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**EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION - UKRAINIAN SECURITY OPTION IN XXI
CENTURY: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS**

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis reviews security options, available for Ukraine since it emerged as an independent state. The choice of taking the European model for the development, integration to the Euro-Atlantic security structures and then to European economic and political space became the dominant option for the current Ukrainian government. Neutrality and Euro-Asian (Russian) vectors of policy, exploited in the past, gained less attention under the current domestic and international environment. However, certain encouragement and support for Ukraine from Western societies is needed. Otherwise, Ukrainian ambitious plans would remain declarations, euro-skepticism among Ukrainians might increase, and a shift from Europe to Eurasia may occur.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the very first days of emerging as an international power, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had a difficult task to project itself as a reliable partner and player on the international arena. At the same time, economic prosperity, the rule of law, freedom of speech and respect for human rights were among the major objectives of its internal policy. Certain achievements have been made, but much still remains to be done.

The Ukraine has become a positive partner and important player in the international realm. Ukraine managed to preserve its integrity and sovereignty, avoid ethnic or other conflicts in its territory. However, for the last 10 years, Ukraine's domestic policy was dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and the "oligarchs" – individuals and groups of powerful politicians and businessmen, which have supported him. Presidential elections in November-December 2004, accompanied by peaceful mass protests, brought to power the chief opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Victor Yushenko. New political leadership of Ukraine is pro-reform and pro-western oriented in its policies. Due to the changes in domestic political sphere, Ukraine could move closer to integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, and a genuine free market economy. However, there is still a challenge for Ukraine not to move toward a Russian sphere of influence with "managed democracy" and an oligarchic economy.

The new period of Ukrainian foreign and security policy started with the changes in the government of Ukraine in 2004. One of the serious challenges for the government at present is to identify the balanced policy, allowing for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and at the same time maintaining real partnership, as opposed to an unequal relationship, with Russia. Active domestic reforms directed towards the fight against the corruption, oligarchic influences, violation of human rights are beginning to be fulfilled gradually. The introduction of European democracies norms and values, development of real market economy, that will integrate the Ukraine more fully into the world economy

and increase in standards of living, are the primary goals for diplomats. The military component of the effort is to ensure proper security environment, as well as to contribute to the positive image of Ukraine in the international arena as reliable and capable partner for peacekeeping, disaster-relief and even security activities.

In order to ensure stable successes in the reform processes and prevent shifts away from a western orientation, NATO and EU membership should become a “golden carrot”, to encourage the Ukraine in its efforts to tackle an array of problems and issues. Thus, the respective signals, policies and assistance from both EU and NATO are welcomed. The Ukraine is different from other Central and Eastern European nations in that it can become a bridge between Europe and Asia. Conversely it can be hijacked by Russian-led Asian enticements. There is a need for the West to deliberate the kind of clear perspective for the Ukraine ultimately to become a member of international institutions like NATO and the EU, helping the nation to motivate itself.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE

Almost 15 years ago, following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, an independent Ukraine emerged in the international arena. A state with a large territory and population, developed industry and significant scientific potential, located at the cross-roads of the European continent, Ukraine had ambitious plans to become an important player in the issues of regional and global stability and security, as well as to develop itself as a democratic nation, with a market and a prosperous economy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The territory of Ukraine made up less than 5% of the entire former USSR. However, it was the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, and contained approximately one third of the military industrial complex of the Soviet Union.

A balanced and rational foreign and security policy was one of the ways to implement the ambitions plans of the young state. Several options were available at that time: neutrality, integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, and the development of closer ties with Russia and Russia-dominated structures. During its time as an independent state, none of these options was implemented to their full extent. Ukrainian foreign and security policy was rather a mixture of directions, or as it was called, a “multi-vector” policy.

Ukraine was determined (at least declaratively) to develop closer relations with the European Union and cooperate extensively with NATO, while its participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was limited. To some extent, this provoked concern in Russia regarding the approach of NATO front lines to Russian borders as well as the isolation of Russia. Thus, the official policy of neutrality was to opt for distancing Ukraine from Russia while at the same time developing closer relations with new and old democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. That situation changed in 2002, when the official course towards European and Euro Atlantic integration was defined as a priority for Ukraine. The European vector was always dominant in Ukrainian policies. However,

different constraints prevented Ukraine from concentrating its efforts in that direction. Although the official recognition of choosing Europe was done, actual progress in Euro integration is still modest.

The purpose of this thesis is to review the development of the situation in Ukraine, changes in the international environment around the state, and to pay special attention to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration choice as the most promising perspective for Ukraine in achieving its objective to become a developed democratic state and an equal partner and member of the European community.

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC AND METHODOLOGY

Recent Presidential elections in Ukraine, held in November-December 2004, accompanied by mass protests of the population against abuses from the acting powers, led to increased attention towards Ukraine from international organizations and nations, and resulted in certain changes in the Ukrainian domestic political environment. The new President and his appointees, earlier representing the opposition to the government, are viewed to be more pro-western in their foreign and security preferences, and willing to conduct reforms in all spheres of state activities in order to introduce European values and standards in Ukraine, thus making it closer to the European family.

Results of that process would affect not only Ukraine, but the region of Eastern and Central Europe, and all of Europe in general. Ukraine's ability to adopt completely the democratic values would increase the security and stability in and around the country. To some extent, that process even can become an example for other former Soviet states in their own path to democratization, such as Moldova, Belarus, and the former Soviet republics in Asia, while the inability to accomplish those ambitious plans would cause Ukraine to be left out of a free and democratic Europe.

This thesis addresses several issues, which could explain the decisions, including:

- Ukraine's aspirations and ambitions at the early stages of its independence;
- The international and domestic environment, affecting the decisions regarding the security and foreign policy options of Ukraine, its changes and developments;
- Internal constraints and limitations, affecting the achievement of defined objectives

The thesis seeks to address the new challenges of Ukrainian policies, and assess the previous successes and misfortunes in order to highlight the most effective solutions, possibly applicable for the future, and to recommend approaches for achieving the new ambitious objectives for Euro-Atlantic integration.

Chapter II describes the early stages of Ukrainian independence, offering a short overview of Ukraine's formation as an independent nation and a participant in the political and security processes in the international arena.

Chapter III examines the recent changes in the international environment and in the domestic political situation of Ukraine, which resulted in adjustments in the security and foreign policies of Ukraine, providing additional emphasis on the European integration objectives.

Chapter IV examines the existing misfortunes of the Ukrainian foreign policies and provides some recommendations for more effective implementation of its European choice.

Chapter V concludes the thesis and summarizes that the policy neutrality and balancing between Eastern and Western models of development is over, and the course towards European integration is the most attractive one for Ukraine in order to be a prosperous state and equal partner. However, the West needs to provide the corresponding positive signals to Ukraine in order to be the "golden carrot" for implementing domestic reforms and joining the European family.

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II. UKRAINE'S SECURITY OPTIONS SINCE THE EMERGENCE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE (1991-1998)

A. EMERGENCE OF THE NEW UKRAINE AND ITS MILITARY

Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe, bordering the Black Sea, between Poland, Romania (EU and NATO nations), and Moldova in the west and Russia in the east. Its land borders Belarus (891 km), Moldova (939 km), Russia (1576 km), Hungary (103 km), Poland (526 km), Romania (531 km), and Slovakia (87 km). In comparison, the territory of Ukraine is slightly smaller than Texas and comprises almost 604,000 sq. km., the largest state in Europe. The current population is approximately 48 million.

After Russia, the Ukrainian republic was the most important economic component of the former Soviet Union, producing about four times the output of the next-ranking republic. Its natural resources include iron ore, coal, manganese, salt, sulfur, graphite, titanium, magnesium, kaolin, nickel, mercury, timber, and arable land. Its fertile black soil generated more than one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output, and its farms provided substantial quantities of meat, milk, grain, and vegetables to other republics. Likewise, its diversified heavy industry supplied the unique equipment (for example, large diameter pipes) and raw materials to industrial and mining sites (vertical drilling apparatus) in other regions of the former USSR. Ukraine depends on imports of energy, especially natural gas, to meet some 85% of its annual energy requirements. Its agricultural sector produces a number of products, including grain, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, and vegetables, beef, and milk. The industries of Ukraine are involved in the production of coal, electric power, ferrous and nonferrous metals, machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, and food processing (especially sugar).¹

In its political arrangements, Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic; its legal system is based on the civil law system, and judicial review of legislative acts. Recent Presidential elections (November 2004), accompanied by peaceful protests of the

¹ Ukraine, the World Fact book, CIA, available [online]: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/up.html>, accessed 29 January 2005.

population against the corrupted regime and meddling with votes, supported the claims that democratic trends are becoming stronger within the country and the significant step towards real (versus declarative) democracy was made.

Ukraine appeared in the international arena as an independent player with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. After the unsuccessful putsch (coup) in Moscow in 1991, the Parliament of Ukrainian SSR (Verkhovna Rada) declared the Act of Ukrainian independence on August 24, which was confirmed by referendum by 90% of the population on December 1 of the same year.

Shortly afterwards, Ukraine was recognized as an independent state in the international arena and 145 countries had recognized Ukraine by middle of 1993. More than 100 have established diplomatic relations.

Since that time, Ukraine withdrew from its nuclear status, voluntarily disposed of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world (1,272 strategic nuclear ICBM and almost 2,500 tactical nukes) and thereby considerably reducing the global nuclear threats.² The amount of conventional armament, stored in Ukrainian territory, was also significantly reduced. The strength of its armed forces was downsized by more than 500,000 by 2001, and further to 210,000 troops in 2004. Ukraine is also one of the most active UN peacekeeping nations.³ The main objective of the Ukrainian independence effort, to become an internationally recognized state, a reliable partner in international relations, and an actor in the international arena, was achieved.

Ukraine inherited a large military from the Soviet Union. However, it was not a military organization, as it is normally perceived. It was rather the “muscle” without brains, since there were no republican-level command and control agencies available for the interior and security services (MVD and KGB). The Army forces comprised five Armies, one Army Corps, 18 divisions (motorized, tank and airborne), three airborne brigades and three artillery divisions. The Air Force had four Air Armies; the Air

² Creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, website of the Defense Ministry of Ukraine, available [online]: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=history&lang=ua>, accessed 30 January 2005

³ For more information about Ukrainian peacekeeping see Information on UN peacekeeping, Ukrainian Mission to UN, available [online]: <http://www.un.int/ukraine/Ukr-UN/Peacekeeping/pko-webfr.htm>, or Ukrainian Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations, available [online]: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=peacekeeping&lang=ua>, accessed 30 January 2005.

Defense included one Air Defense Army and three AD Corps. The Black Sea fleet was not under Ukrainian control initially and was divided between Ukraine and Russia in 1997. In terms of numbers, Ukraine had more than 780,000 personnel, 6,500 tanks, 7,000 armored combat vehicles, 1,500 combat aircraft, 350 naval combat and support ships, which was all that composed the second strategic echelon of the Soviet western theatre of operation. Besides, the nuclear arsenal, millions of tons of ammunition, were stored in Ukraine. Thirty-four military educational institutions and 78 military faculties at civilian universities trained specialists for the Soviet military in Ukraine. One-third of the Soviet Military-Industrial complex, with some unique shipbuilding and missile capabilities, was concentrated in Ukraine, employing some 2.7 million people.

Due to the absence of experience in creating its national Armed Forces, the Ukrainian military was recreated to reflect the Soviet-model system. Since 1991, the number of personnel decreased to approximately 210,000 in 2004. Further reductions are planned so that the total is 200,000 by the end of 2005, including 160,000 military personnel. Mr. L. Polyakov,⁴ an expert from the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, in his research recognizes, that “a certain level of experience was achieved by Ukrainian military in some low-cost/low-tech areas (international peacekeeping; combat engineering, chemical, biological, and radiological protection; military education; and transport aviation).”⁵

B. GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF UKRAINE (1991-1998)

The end of the Cold War was marked by the appearance of new states, new political trends and transformations. The bi-polar world was replaced with new arrangements at the end of the 20th century. Global, regional and sub-regional politics and international relations needed to be readjusted to the new realities. Ukraine was one of many nations in Europe attempting to find its place “in the sun.”

Three global geo-political zones, which influenced future developments in world politics, enhanced their activities and development in that period at the end of the Cold

⁴ Mr. Leonid Polyakov was assigned to the position of the First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine on February 19, 2005. Press-Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Leadership, available [online]: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=ua&part=command&sub=2>, accessed 31 January 2005.

⁵ Mr. Leonid I. Polyakov, *U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the Value of Interoperability*, Strategic Studies institute, US Army War College, December 2004, p. 8.

War: European, North American, and Asian-Pacific. As far as the Asian-Pacific region is concerned, it had less influence on the situation in and around Ukraine while more attention could be devoted to the North American and European zones.

NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, dominated by the United States, and the European Union, were the main tools for cooperation and integration in these zones. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of potential enemies for collective security, NATO intended to become a core of North America and an integrated Europe security forum. In its “National Security Strategy for a New Century” (May 1997), the United States defined its intent to continue its involvement in European affairs as one of its key priorities.⁶

Considerable attention was devoted to new developing democracies in Europe: “The United States has vital security interests in the evolution of Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS into stable, modern democracies, peacefully and prosperously integrated into a world community where representative government, the rule of law, free and fair trade and cooperative security are the norm.”⁷

In general terms, international relations in the period immediately after the end of the Cold War could be characterized as rather tense. Despite the elimination of principal ideological discrepancies between the West and East, the reduction of the Armed Forces and defense expenditures in almost every nation, the transformation from the bi-polar to multi-polar (or even unipolar) realm was accompanied by a number of regional conflicts, including ethnic tensions in Europe.

New states appeared in Central and Eastern Europe. The former multinational states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. At the same time, West European nations increased the cooperation within political and economic structures of the European Union, which caused the third wave of EU enlargement in 1995 (Austria, Finland, and Sweden on January 1). Central and Eastern European states increased cooperation with the EU as well by signing Europe agreements and applying for membership.

⁶ “Ukraine” was mentioned in that document at least 11 times.

⁷ National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, D.C., The White House, 1997, Ch III.

The geopolitical environment of the new Ukraine was characterized by two principal tendencies during that period: disintegration and decentralization of the totalitarian system, from the “east of the Berlin Wall”, increased cooperation within Central and Eastern European nations and between them and the European Union.⁸ However, the European states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, seemed to be excluded from that process at the time, unlike the Baltic States.

The formation of the new European nations was largely completed by 1996. Some states managed to do it peacefully, as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while others underwent military conflicts, which were partly solved and either erupted later or involved a continuous international peacekeeping presence.

There were three principal areas of integration in Europe during that period. The first was Western Europe, with the successful development of the European Union. Central Europe and Baltic states, which were rather successfully developing in economic terms, was the second zone. The third was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was an attempt to reintegrate the former Soviet republics under the dominance of Russia. Russia was looking for preserving its leading role among the “near abroad,” and these ambitions seems not to have changed 10 years later.

The European Union was rather cautious in giving strong promises and signals to the Central and Eastern European nations willing to join it. Membership in the EU was open for states meeting certain requirements in political, economic, social areas (Aquis Communautaire), and the ability of the states to reach those requirements. The principle measurement for decision-making was to prove the reliability of their new (post-totalitarian) economic and political structures.

C. GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

The period of reaffirming Ukraine as a nation-state required creating foreign and security policy objectives and goals, and national interests in general. Security interests were the most important component of national interests since ensured national security leads to the development of statehood.

⁸ Leonid Golopatyuk, *Ukraine Security Option in New Europe*, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998, p. 17.

Due to the severe socio-economic crises occurring in Ukraine soon after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the dominant idea of government was the need for the social and economic stabilization of the situation in Ukraine. However, in order to meet these challenges successfully, several preconditions were required: real independence, strong state power, and cooperation with the international community.

Ukraine was faced with a rather difficult issue: selecting its own way of achieving its goals and objectives. Being a young state, lacking the knowledge and experience in state building, wrong decisions made concerning its geopolitical orientation could cause a state's downfall even in peacetime.⁹

Firstly, with the end of the Cold War, the new distribution of powers in Europe emerged and a new balance of power was formed. European-led and Russian-led options were then made available to Ukraine. Ukraine found itself between renewed regional ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and experienced tensions in Moldova and Transdnistria right on its borders. Thus, issues of state security became much more important.

The national and geopolitical interests of Ukraine in those times were the following:¹⁰

- The preservation of the entire present territory of Ukraine;
- The security and prosperity of Ukraine's neighbors, particularly, those regions where dense concentrations of ethnic Ukrainians are found;
- The geographical zones that directly adjoin Ukraine's borders;
- The states with which Ukraine can join into alliance relations in order to counter an external threat.

The threats, envisaged by Ukraine at that time, were many-sided and covered different dimensions of social life in Ukraine. Some external potential threats included:¹¹

⁹ L. Golopatyuk, p. 19.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 20, cross-reference to O. Y. Manachinskiy, *Military Security of Ukraine*, Kyiv, National Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 8.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 20, cross-reference M. O. Korop, "Geopolicy and National Security of Ukraine," Kyiv, Nauka i Oborona 4, 1995.

- Intervention in the domestic affairs of Ukraine by other states;
- Territorial claims against Ukraine, as well as actions against Ukraine's state sovereignty;
- Presence of foreign Armed Forces on Ukrainian territory;
- Military and political instability, including the unsteadiness of the governmental institutions in the countries adjacent to Ukraine; and
- External support, overt or well concealed, for separatist tendencies in specific regions of Ukraine.

The situation in Ukraine at that period caused extended discussions among politicians and scholars about the “paradox of Ukraine’s national security.” Ukraine’s close relations and even dependence (especially in the spheres of economic and resources) on the former Soviet republics, and in particular Russia, seemed to be the way out of the crisis. At the same time, the eastern neighbor of Ukraine seemed to be the principal political factor, able to generate mentioned external threats or at least be largely connected with them.

The clear “pro-Western” or “pro-Russian” orientation of the policy was hardly to be achieved. The creation of the hierarchy of national interests in Ukraine was an extremely complicated process. Samuel Huntington, developing his “Clash of Civilization” arguments, mentions that the separation line between “Western Christianity” (Europe) and “Moscow-led Orthodox” goes through Ukraine, dividing the country in half.¹² Certain correlations between the preferences for foreign policy and territory could be noticed. The Western part of Ukraine is more oriented towards Europe, while the population of the East is more linked with Russia. Obviously, Western and Russian value systems are influential since Western Ukraine territories were incorporated in the current state during the times of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Eastern territories have been under Russian rule since the middle of the 17th century.

The Ukrainian leadership was looking for solutions to the security “paradox”. The “multi-vector policy” (movements towards all directions) was selected as the primary foreign policy orientation for Ukraine. All areas around Ukraine were included as priorities for its foreign engagement. However, the initial way of “black and white”

¹² Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, c1996, p. 138.

thinking, pertaining to the politicians and the public at large during the first years of independence, was replaced with more complex considerations. Ukraine had to face the challenge of choosing Europe or Eurasia as its geopolitical and geostrategic fellow.

D. NEUTRALITY AS A STRATEGIC OPTION OF UKRAINE

The “Europe-Eurasia dilemma”, namely the choice between enhancing relations with the CIS countries, Central Asia and the Caucasus, or closer linkage with European nations (especially Western and Central Europe), to some extent, led to Ukraine’s preference for neutrality status.

Neutrality status was made public by the Declaration of the State Sovereignty (1990), stating that the Ukrainian state was adopting the policy of “permanent neutrality”. This status meant that Ukraine was not to participate in any military conflicts between other nations, as well as not join any military alliances or blocks, nor provide its territory to foreign forces or military bases.¹³

The desire for neutrality status was also conditioned on the historical background of Ukraine. However, with the dissolution of the bipolar international environment of the Cold War era, the significance of neutral status seems to be decreased.

Historically, neutral European states (such as Austria, Finland or Switzerland) reviewed their neutrality at the same time. As a result of such revisions, Switzerland became the 190th member of the UN in September 2002. Austria, Finland and Switzerland are also active participants of international processes in Europe. Austria joined the EU in 1995. In addition to the economic dimension, the security (military) component of the European Union is receiving more attention and importance now, thus requiring the revision of neutrality in military terms as well. The participation of these nations in the NATO Partnership for Peace program could also be added.

The neutrality status of Ukraine was not the final objective per se. Rather it was the way to achieve its major goals, independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, political stability and economic prosperity, and partly not provoking Russia by active western ambitions.

¹³ Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, Kyiv, June 16, 1990.

Even during that period, many Ukrainian officials did not necessarily consider neutrality a permanent state. However, the shift from uncertain declarations towards specific actions took place long afterwards.

E. UKRAINIAN COOPERATION WITH NATO AND WESTERN INSTITUTIONS

NATO and the European Union were the principal agents of the European arena with the end of the Cold War. However, the decisions regarding enlargement to the East were not easy, requiring the careful analysis from the alliances and necessity to meet corresponding requirements for the nations-applicants. The period of 1991-1998 was the period of adaptation and partly the transformation, at least for NATO, which was identifying its new roles, missions and status upon the disappearance of its principal enemy.

The new democracies, which appeared in Central and Eastern Europe, had several available frameworks for cooperation: the United Nations Organization, the OSCE, and the Partnership for Peace Program (designed to bring these new countries closer to NATO and improve their interoperability).

Ukraine` unprecedented decision to rid itself of nuclear armament, and its active participation in peacekeeping operations (Ukraine started its peacekeeping activities in 1992 in UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia) were among the factors, which positively affected the image of Ukraine as a reliable partner in international relations, and not as a nation opposing Western values.

Ukraine is a state, which at the same time belongs to Eastern, Central and Southern Europe. To some extent, Ukraine could play a solidifying role and provide stability in the area that belonged to the USSR or was under its control. Commitments to democratic values and contributions to the consolidation of regional and international security were the confirmation of Ukraine's European-oriented affiliations. The complicated task to overcome the "separation line," drawn in some European minds along the border of the CIS (former Eastern border of the USSR) was partly fulfilled by Ukraine's achievements on its western-integration path.

Still, Ukraine had a complicated mission to change its image among the Western societies from a state of the former Warsaw pact and the former USSR republic to a state of Eastern Europe, willing and able to become a member of the European family. Ukraine's movement towards Europe was gradual and cautious. Many politicians and scholars believed that joining the European economic zone and its political space would be beneficial for Ukraine. Closer European relations could decrease influence, or partly, dependence on Russia.

Strategic partnership with the superpowers of the United States and Russia, was also mentioned as a foreign policy priority of Ukraine. However, the neutrality status and "multi-vector" foreign policy prevented Ukraine and the superpowers from developing its cooperation further and deeper. Ukraine seemed to have an image of being an unpredictable player in that regard. Despite all progress achieved in cooperation with Western political and security institutions, possible Ukrainian Eurasian affiliations were concerns among its Western partners.

Ukraine signed the partnership agreement with the EU in 1994, being the first CIS state to sign such a document. In 1995, Ukraine was admitted to the Council of Europe. In 1997, Ukraine concluded the agreement with the WEU on providing its strategic air-lift capabilities. However, Ukraine's neutral status and involvement in CIS activities prevented Ukraine from enhancing its relations with the WEU, enjoying only exchanges of information and visits.¹⁴

Cooperation with NATO became the primary tool of bringing Ukraine closer to European institutions. Due to its economic difficulties, and as a result of its quite modest share of the world economy, the weak state power institutions, underdeveloped civil society and underdeveloped domestic markets, Ukraine was rather an object than the subject of relations with NATO. However, partly compensated by the mutual interests of the parties (compared even to the EU), NATO was interested in Ukraine no less than Ukraine in NATO. Perhaps, Ukraine was even modest in its ambitions, counterbalanced by the Eurasian affiliations of part of its population and politicians.

¹⁴ L. Golopatyuk, p. 32.

Ukraine's involvement in cooperation with NATO was important for both parties. Ukraine could become a front line of defense against growing Russian imperial ambitions. To some extent, Ukraine could become a model for engaging other states (such as Russia) in cooperating with NATO and breaking its image as an enemy among senior officials and populations. Assistant NATO Secretary General, in his interview regarding Ukraine-NATO cooperation noted, that "a strong, independent and democratic Ukraine is good for Ukraine and good for NATO and its Partners. We have made a common commitment to security in the Euro-Atlantic area, which is well illustrated by the Polish-Ukrainian battalion serving in Kosovo"¹⁵ In turn, Ukraine was able to learn from the experience of NATO nations in transitioning their respective militaries, introducing civilian control, conducting reforms and troop downsizing.

The NATO Summit in Madrid in 1997 was the peak of Ukraine-NATO Cooperation of that period. The Charter of Distinctive partnership between Ukraine and NATO was signed at that forum. It was also the result of the gradual evolution in the minds of leadership, constrained by Soviet heritage. Compared to the successes of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, recognized during the Madrid Summit, Ukraine reached the state of distinctive partnership with NATO. Ukrainian leaders, taking into consideration NATO's approach to its borders, sought to have Ukraine's interests taken into account and establish a special partnership with NATO. The following could be highlighted as the mutual NATO-Ukraine consensus.

Article of Chapter II, Principles for the Development of NATO-Ukraine Relations addressed concerns of Ukraine regarding its territorial integrity:

- respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other states, for the inviolability of frontiers, and the development of good-neighborly relations

Ukraine was looking for additional security (assurances) mechanisms to be introduced upon withdrawal of nuclear armament from Ukraine. Chapter V, Cooperation for a More Secure Europe, envisaged a foundation of a crisis consultative mechanism "to

¹⁵ NATO-Ukraine cooperation on defense reform, Interview with Edgar Buckley, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations, in NATO-Ukraine magazine Novyny, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021028a.htm>, accessed January 31, 2005.

consult together whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.” Besides, it was underlined that NATO nations have “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so.”¹⁶

This was an important milestone in Ukraine-West security cooperation. Development of NATO-Ukraine relations, based on that distinctive partnership, should provide a basis for qualitative evolution in the future.¹⁷ Ukrainian successes in peacekeeping activities, to some extent achieving interoperability, and number of successfully conducted exercises, could be viewed as preconditions for that evolution.

F. AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS UKRAINE-NATO COOPERATION

The reaction of the U.S. officials to the development of Ukrainian-NATO cooperation was entirely positive. The intention of Ukraine to be integrated in the world community, having developed a democratic government, the rule of law, free trade and cooperative security, entirely corresponded to the provisions of the U.S. National Security Strategy (of 1997). Although military cooperation was only one of the pillars of U.S.-Ukraine relations, referring to NATO as security (defense-related subject), security (mil-to-mil) cooperation, visit exchanges, mutual student invitations and other activities started soon after the independence of Ukraine, even before signing the first fundamental document in the area of military cooperation – the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the U.S. Department of Defense (1993).¹⁸ As a result of the successful developments of that cooperation, the U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Commission, led by President Kuchma and Vice President Gore was established in September 1996. U.S. assistance to Ukraine was introduced in many forms, including military exercises. However, the most valuable was the training and support associated with this equipment. Since its establishment in Ukraine in 1992, the U.S. International

¹⁶ Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, Madrid, 9 July 1997, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/ukrchrt.htm>, accessed January 31, 2005.

¹⁷ L. Golopatyuk, p. 39.

¹⁸ L. Polyakov, p. 12.

Military Education and Training (IMET) educated about 500 Ukrainian officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and over 100 civilians in U.S. military establishments. IMET training supported efforts to improve interoperability between the Ukrainian and U.S. and NATO militaries and to promote the transformation and restructuring within the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The U.S. Department of State Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program and U.S. Department of State Peacekeeping Operations program supported Ukraine's interoperability with U.S./NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. In particular, this support is made available to Ukrainian participation in the Ukrainian-Polish Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) peacekeeping support operations within the U.S. sector of Kosovo. This funding is not only helping to solve NATO manpower needs, but provides Ukrainian troops experience in interoperability with Western forces and exposure to NATO professional standards and practices.

In terms of security cooperation, the United States also has provided significant technical support in nonproliferation efforts and strengthening Ukraine's export control system. It supported the strengthening of Ukraine's borders against illegal migration and cross-border crime.

Russian politicians of that period, ranging from Western-oriented reformers to radical nationalists, seemed to be united in the idea, that Russia should assume the dominant role over newly independent former Soviet Republics. Russian intervention in the Moldova-Transnistria conflict, Georgia and Abkhazia, and Nagornyy Karabekh are a few examples of Russian "areas of interests", in which Russia would like to maintain its influence. Two primary alternatives were available for Russians at that time and both included the involvement of Ukraine:¹⁹

To develop as a democracy, as a Europe-oriented nation, respecting and recognizing the sovereignty and independence of its neighbors - that variant was the most welcomed by Ukraine, Europe and the world at large.

The other option would be the restoration of (or formation of a new) Russia-led empire. First of all, it is the historical developments of both Ukraine and Russia. The

¹⁹ L. Golopatyuk, p. 41.

Kievan Rus was the first Slavic state, located on the large part of Ukrainian territory. The capital of the state was Kiev. The present-day Russian territories were known as “Moscovia”, named after the Moscow principality. Upon the spread of its colonial rule over Ukraine (weakened by being under the occupation of Tatars, then Polish and Lithuanian kingdoms) at the end of the 17th century, Russia gradually took over the ancient history of the Kievan Rus as the evidence of its long existence and antiqueness of its statehood, aiming to achieve more weight among other European great powers. Perhaps, it was part of the policy of those times, besides wars for access to the seas and enlarging its territories. For a long time afterwards, Russia did its best to convince everyone that Ukraine was always a part of Russia, and that Ukrainians are the sub-species (the young brothers) of Russians.

The second element is that because of its geopolitical location and potential, Ukraine had an important role in formation, development, and later even the disintegration of both the Russian and Soviet empires. Bringing Ukraine closer to Russia, which was initiated by the Pereyaslav Treaty in 1654, enhanced Russian positions and also brought its borders closer to Western Europe. Possession of fruitful Ukrainian terrains was a very beneficial factor for the agricultural Russian empire of the 18th century.

Later, when the Russian empire collapsed in 1917 and the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, Ukraine had some important roles to play as well.

Thus, Russian reintegration ambitions towards former Soviet nations could become an accelerating factor for the Ukraine’s closer integration with NATO and Europe in order to defend its integrity and sovereignty.

G. UKRAINE-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH OTHER NEIGHBORING STATES

Since the first days of Ukrainian independence, many Russian political elites viewed the distancing of Ukraine as temporary and unwanted. The pressure on Ukraine to abolish its status as an independent nation began immediately after August 1991 after the declaration of Ukraine’s independence.

Russian anti-Ukrainian policies were created based on the belief that despite obtaining its independence, Ukraine, in fact, had no idea what to do with it. One of the pillars for such anti-Ukraine feeling in Russia was the old imperial-type mentality of Russians, especially among politicians and military leaders. Historically, Russia often achieved its national interests at the expense of others. However, certain features pertain to Ukraine-Russia relations only.

Ukrainians always tried to incorporate its striving for independence in the development of constructive relations with Russia. The second largest aspiration to be achieved and dreamed of was economic prosperity. Many believed that economic prosperity and ability to perform the economic reforms depends upon ties with Russia. However, the cost would be independence or partial independence, which to some extent, could become a dilemma. What level of independence could be achieved under the desired economic prosperity? In the case of relations with Russia, it could mean more economic benefits under the significant political influence of Russia.

The developing Ukraine-European cooperation partly could affect that dilemma. Ukraine would have an opportunity to select the policies, less dependent on post-Soviet space. However, complete abolishment of the “Russian vector” of its foreign policy is impossible.

Ukraine’s pro-western movements and actions diminish Russian imperial ambitions. Russia’s desire to stay a great power (or regional power at least) makes Russian leaders less willing to accept the system of relations, which is different from “Great Power – satellites”, from the former Soviet republics. In this regard, Ukraine’s strategic interests to be an independent player in the international arena do not correspond to those of Russia, or at least as viewed by its political elites.

Perspectives of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration means a decrease in Russian influence over Ukraine and its withdrawal from the “Eurasia zone”. Ukraine’s position in the triangle of U.S.-Russia-Ukraine cooperation at the end of the century was often more benevolent towards U.S. interests. Enhancing Ukraine-NATO

cooperation eventually meant the proximity of NATO activities on the borders of Russia, which did not make Russians happy. Also regarding the issue of CIS existence, Ukraine's views differed from Russia.

As a result of these considerations, Ukrainian scholars offered the model of Ukraine-Russia cooperation, which could be called "cooperative independence" or relations based on the bilateral commitments to strengthen Russia and Ukraine as stable and independent states. Any form of military or political alliance between nations is excluded. However, some interstate agencies could be established to coordinate common economic and ecological problems.²⁰ A decrease in Ukraine's dependence on Russia in key economic and resource matters is also one of the vital tasks, especially in the area of oil and energy resources. Ukrainian policies never were directed against Russia per se, but rather countering its imperial ambitions. There is an imminent desire to separate economic relations from political ties, and eventually reduce its economic and energy dependence on Russia.

The early years of Ukraine's existence as an independent nation were marked by a serious economic crisis. The vital task of the government was to create preconditions to overcome that crisis, improve the living standards, and to create favorable international environments for that process. Due to the limited available resources, cooperation with several states was defined as the Ukrainian strategic priority, in order to better achieve its goals and objectives.

The Russian Federation was defined as one of the priorities in cooperation. The main objective was to develop normal balanced relations. Otherwise, balanced foreign policy with other regions of the world would hardly be possible to achieve without Russian influence or interference.

The United States was another strategic partner of Ukraine. The period of 1991-1998 was rather successful in terms of state-to-state relations. Relations at the initial stage were devoted to the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. Upon successful completion of that task, the range of issues was developed in a dialogue. Growing attention to Ukraine as a

²⁰ L. Golopatyuk, cross-reference to Ukraine National Security, National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kyiv, 1997, pp. 108-118.

developing democracy and important state in Europe took place among the U.S. officials at the same time. The exchange of visits of high-ranking officials took place. Further developments of relations depended upon Ukraine's ability to meet the challenges of creating a civil society, a free market economy, overcome corruption and negative Soviet heritages.

Germany happened to become the largest economic and trade partner of Ukraine in Western Europe. By and large, Ukraine-Germany relations were not developed in a manner preferred by Kiev. Germany was more interested in relations with Poland and Russia at the time. Despite that fact, Germany became the second largest trading partner of Ukraine, followed by the United States, and the largest foreign investor in the Ukrainian economy.²¹ Cooperation in the area of military contacts, reformation of the Armed Forces, port calls, and information exchange and arms control was rather successfully developed.

However, more possibilities existed to enhance cooperation with Germany, in particular, by improving its domestic investment system, paying more attention to the ethnic German minority in Ukraine, and having more active Ukrainian diplomacy in Germany. Focusing attention on enhancing cooperation with Austria and the Czech Republic, traditional German trading partners, would also be possible and beneficial at that time.

Despite the historical hostilities in Ukrainian-Polish relations, the state of cooperation of newly emerged democracies was rather positive, considering the increasing role of Poland in Europe in the context of the EU and NATO. Poland became another major partner for Ukrainian international cooperation. Poland was seen, to some extent, as a bridge between the EU, NATO and Ukraine. In its turn, Poland was keen to see a stable and prosperous Ukraine as its neighbor. Poland strongly supported Ukraine's western aspirations and intentions to integrate into European institutions.

²¹ L. Golopatyuk, p. 52.

Turkey was another Ukrainian neighbor, with whom close friendly relations were established. Cooperation in the area of Black Sea related matters, concerns about Russian foreign policy and its influence over the Black Sea and Caucuses, Turkey's NATO membership laid the foundation for Turkey's and Ukraine's strategic rapprochement.

Ukrainian relations with other European nations, namely Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, and its neighbors, the former Soviet states of Moldova and Belarus, were also developed positively. Compared to the countries of "strategic interest", cooperation could seem not to be so concentrated. However, there were no major grievances or problems.

Domestic concerns over the economic and social crisis diverted the attention of the political leaders of Ukraine from the active and intensive development of a foreign policy. Sometimes the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs acted on its own, lacking clear political guidance from the government. However, even despite that, the foreign policy of Ukraine in 1991-1998 was rather successful in promoting its national strategic interests. Ukraine managed to establish successful bilateral relations with most of its strategic partners and neighbors and achieve international recognition as a country, able to contribute to the regional security and stability, be a friendly neighbor, respecting the interests of others and having its own goals and objectives.

H. CONCLUSION

The issue of finding its place among other states in the international arena appeared in Ukraine's agenda immediately upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and gaining its independence.

Respecting international laws, Ukraine's intent was to occupy its place without violating the interests of others. Certain achievements were made in the area of developing democracy, creating the state based on the rule of law, respect for human rights, overcoming the economic and political crises and the legacy of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine faced several challenges in that initial period of its existence. These included the need to develop its domestic and foreign policies, which would facilitate the development of the state. The Ukraine-Russia relations were another important agenda for consideration by Ukrainian political elites. It is vitally important for Ukraine to

maintain a constructive dialogue with Russia, but Ukraine's prospects in Russia would be better supported through Europe. Taking European ideas and bringing them to Russia (or bringing Russia closer to Europe) would be beneficial for all parties involved.

Ukraine's western aspirations, constrained by Russian influence and Soviet-type mentality of some leaders, required the support and enhancement from European allies. Having a stable and prosperous independent Ukraine on European borders is definitely better than having it as part of the area and influenced by Russian empire ambitions.

Improving the economic situation, affected by economic crises, developing the market economy and conducting reforms were also pressing issues. Establishing relations with NATO was another important step in promoting Ukraine's security considerations. Close economic and political support for Ukraine at that initial moment was an important investment in its own security in the long term.

That initial period generally should be characterized as positive. Ukraine managed to preserve its integrity and sovereignty, avoid ethnic or other conflicts in its territory, develop constructive relations with its neighbors and strategic partners, and gradually to proceed towards participation in regional, European and world security issues and economies.

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III. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DOMESTIC POLICIES OF UKRAINE (1999-2005)

A. EUROPEAN UNION – EMERGING SUPERPOWER?

Launched in 1951 by six members, Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) at the end of 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries has developed into a powerful economic, political, and even to some extent, security institution. ECSC, incorporated with the Energy Community (Euroatom) and European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market), established a European Community (EC). The EC gradually transformed into the European Union (EU), presently encompassing 25 members, expecting Bulgaria and Romania to join soon and debating on a candidate country - Turkey.

The latest (and the largest) enlargement of the EU took place in 2004, including 10 new members to the European family: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. That enlargement was preceded by certain developments within the Union, increasing the EU weight in the international arena.

EU achievements in economic and social progress, increasing living and working conditions, developing a single market, and a custom and monetary union²² are significant. Recent enlargement, which involved countries relatively underdeveloped, compared to the EU states, added some challenges to the Union:

²² The European monetary system, launched in 1979 in order to stabilize exchange rates, reduced inflation, and preparing for monetary integration, completed its mission successfully. In 1999, members of the EU (twelve at the moment) finally and firmly established the exchange rates between respective national currencies, and in 2002, the EURO, a common European currency was introduced in bills and coins.

disparity levels in the enlarged EU have substantially increased. The immediate focus of attention is in the new Member States - over 92% of population lives in regions with a GDP/head under 75% of the EU25 average. 61% of the population lives in regions below 50%; in the former EU15 countries, no region falls below this level.²³

However, Europeans are optimistic in their prognoses and expect the situation to be improved for the benefit of all “old” and “new” EU members:

Enlargement of the EU to 25 countries costs money initially as the EU helps newcomers complete the transition to becoming competitive free market economies. However, there are tangible economic benefits to the EU. The economy of the ‘old’ member states benefits since, as previous enlargements have shown, competition and increased personal mobility are good for growth. By the end of the decade, the combined economies of the ‘old’ member states could be 1% larger than they would otherwise have been. The newcomers, meanwhile, can expect up to 1% more growth each year from membership. This will come largely from higher investment and from reforming these economies so that they run more efficiently. Standards of living and quality of life will improve. It could also mean the creation of more than 300 000 jobs in these countries by 2010.²⁴

The EU’s ambitious plans to evolve outside the frameworks of the regional economic union were implemented in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, introduced in 1993 by the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty). In 1999, following the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the European Council gained power to adopt long-term common strategies. Common strategies of the EU towards Russia and Ukraine²⁵ were adopted the same year.

The Common European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) directed towards the creation of the EU defense capabilities, evolved from the CFSP in 1999-2000:

²³ Latest European regional statistics confirm Commission’s proposal on Structural Funds for 2007-2013, Press Release, available [on-line]: <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/107&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en>, accessed 2 February 2005.

²⁴ European Commission, *Going for Growth, The Economy of the EU*, September 2003, p. 6, available [on-line]: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/move/40/en.pdf>, accessed 2 February 2005.

²⁵ International Treaties of Ukraine, Library of Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine, available [on-line]: <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?user=c720y1999>, accessed 2 February 2005.

To reinforce the Union's ability to deal with crisis situations in neighboring regions or further afield, plans are in hand, in close cooperation with NATO, to set up a rapid reaction military force to carry out peace-keeping and other non-combat tasks at short notice. The existence of such a force would complement the EU's existing possibilities, which include police operations, border controls and civilian humanitarian assistance.²⁶

The Amsterdam Treaty added the Treaty of the European Union with the "Petersberg Tasks" for humanitarian relief and rescue missions, peacekeeping, the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. ESDP is not directed towards undermining NATO's collective defense role. The EU force is to be used in case of NATO unwillingness to participate or when the scope of the mission does not meet NATO requirements.

The scope of European areas of interest is also worth mentioning. European Security Strategy recognizes EU as a "global player" who is ready to share responsibility for "global security", not limiting itself to the European theatre only.

In January 2003, the EU's civilian crisis management force took over the U.N. police operations in Bosnia as the first-ever ESDP mission. "Operation Concordia", lasting from March to December, was the first military mission of the EU, which replaced the NATO peacekeeping mission in Macedonia. From June to September 2003, the EU led an international peacekeeping force of 1,400 in the Congo. That mission was requested by the United Nations and headed by France, planned by the French military experts in national headquarters, and conducted without recourse to NATO assets.²⁷ On 2 December 2004, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina was concluded and the European Union's follow-on EUFOR mission started.

The EU appeared to become a new security actor. ESDP has achieved rather significant progress within a short period of time, proving the EU the ability to operate within and even outside Europe managing crises. An intensive discussion is going on

²⁶ European Commission, *The European Union and the World*, December 2000, p. 6, available [online]: http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/move/23/txt_en.pdf, accessed 2 February 2005.

²⁷ Kristin Archik, Paul Gallis, *NATO and the European Union*, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, April 6, 2004, pp. 15-16.

regarding the development of EU military power, the possibilities of duplicating or competing with NATO structures, and undermining the transatlantic security guarantee.

B. NATO ENLARGEMENT

The end of the Cold War required the revision of roles and missions of NATO in a new environment, in the absence of its potential adversary. The period, covered in the previous chapter, was characterized by the great amount of research and studies done, outlining the perspectives and future of the organization. As a result, the Study on the Enlargement was produced in 1995, which outlined the principles and purposes of the enlargement, as the way to provide “increased stability and security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, without recreating dividing lines.”²⁸ Referring to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, “the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty,”²⁹ the study also provides guidelines for assessing the suitability of nations to be NATO members.

Potential members should have free market economies and democratic political systems based on the rule of law. Commitment to norms of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is another issue of consideration during the process of seeking membership. Nations have to resolve all ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Civilian control over militaries is also required. Nations should have the ability to contribute to NATO’s collective defense and to its missions, and be (or at least work in order to be) interoperable with NATO forces. NATO has no established criteria for accepting new members. The members of the Alliance make the decision on accession of new members. It could also be a political decision versus one made for practical considerations. In the case of the enlargement in 2004, most new nations are able to make at least *modest* contributions to NATO’s peacekeeping functions. None of the countries are at present able to contribute *substantially* to NATO’s collective defense, although all develop rapid reaction forces of company size or larger to

²⁸ Study on NATO Enlargement, Chapter 1, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm>, accessed 4 February 2005.

²⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm#Art10>, accessed 1 February 2005.

deploy abroad to fight alongside NATO troops. However, those nations still face difficulties in sustaining these forces themselves and in having enough troops to rotate them into and out of these deployments.³⁰

All of the countries, which became NATO members or applied for membership, participated in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) was a mechanism to evaluate the progress on the way to NATO membership, PfP per se was a framework for joint military activities and achieving a certain level of interoperability. The EAPC is NATO's political forum with non-NATO countries. Besides, PfP nations and applicants received defense-related monetary assistance from the United States in the form of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds.

The actual enlargement of NATO, based on the aforementioned principles, took place twice since the end of the Cold War. On March 12, 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, former Warsaw Pact countries, formally became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was the beginning of the second stage of the process of admitting new countries to the Alliance since 1983. Nine additional central and eastern European nations applied to join the alliance at the same time: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

On March 29, 2004, seven countries out of nine (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) became the newest members of NATO upon submission of their instruments of ratification in a ceremony in Washington, D.C. Most of the governments have already been participating in NATO peacekeeping operations, and have had observer status at some NATO meetings. The NATO Istanbul Summit did not extend new invitations to candidate states, although Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia aspire to membership.

³⁰ Steven Woehrel, Julie Kim, and Carl Ek, *NATO Applicant States: A Status Report*, April 25, 2003, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress.

NATO operations since the end of the Cold War included a large number of missions. In 1995, NATO was involved in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. The first Stabilization Force (SFOR)³¹ was comprised of 60,000 troops. By June 2004, SFOR was downsized by roughly 7,000 troops. On 2 December, 2004, the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was replaced by the European Union's 7,000-strong EUFOR. The Kosovo Force (KFOR),³² a NATO-led international force responsible for establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo, was another NATO operation, launched in June 1999 under a United Nations mandate.

In August 2003, NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The ISAF initially controlled only Kabul and the provincial city of Kunduz, (consisting of some 6,500 soldiers), but NATO made a decision to extend ISAF to other parts of the country in 2004. Upon the major defeat of the Taliban movement by U.S. troops and the presidential elections in October-November 2004, ISAF's directed its activities to more nation-building efforts. It supports the operation of "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs), composed of 80-200 troops and civil affairs officers. The PRT implement projects to restore the economy of the state, provide security and extend the scope of the central government control.

NATO involvement in operations causes some concerns among members regarding troops and capabilities. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, addressing the Slovenian Parliament,³³ mentioned that "European Allies and Canada together have around one and a half million men and women in uniform. Over two million if you count the reserves. However, with around 60,000 troops deployed in multi-national operations, they claim to be overstretched."

³¹ SFOR (Stabilization Force), available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/sfor/links.htm>, accessed 2 February 2005.

³² KFOR Information, Kosovo Force, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm>, accessed 2 February 2005.

³³ Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Slovenian Parliament, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 23 April 2004, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040423a.htm>, accessed 12 December 2004.

NATO enlargements brought the borders of the Alliance directly to the borders of Ukraine. Russia is not happy with the development of the situation. Ukraine still stays in the buffer zone of two (not antagonistic, but different in views) powers.

C. KOSOVO CRISIS

The disappearance of the bi-polar system of international relations, the abolishment of Soviet influence as a superpower over Central and Eastern European states, revived the goals for independence among the people of these states. The former Socialist Federative Republic Yugoslavia was one such state. Since the beginning of the 1990's, hostilities in the country continued with different intensity and between different territories. With the declaration of independence of Slovenia in June 1991, Serbs living in Croatia and the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) used force to oppose such developments of the situation. Croatia became the next area of tensions, involving hostilities between Croats and Serbs. Later, the situation deteriorated in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁴ Ethnic cleansings, uncontrolled refugees movements, and economic crises became a serious challenge to the stability in the Balkan region and in Europe in general. The Kosovo crises of 1998-1999 were one of the most serious deteriorations, which affected not only the region, but also all European nations and even trans-Atlantic relations.

In 1998, the outbreak of violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Serbian authorities took place in the former Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Since autonomy was granted to the region, the Albanian majority was repressed due to the large Serbian military presence and isolation from the outside. Albanians were able only to resist nonviolently. Albanian Kosovars created a parallel "state" within Kosovo. The situation with the local "balance of powers" changed in 1997. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital. About the same time, a financial crisis promoted the collapse of the government in Albania. Its military arsenals appeared to be uncontrolled. Black marketers obtained access to the weaponry, eventually providing it to the Kosovo's revolutionary movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). KLA assassinated Serbian policemen, Serbian officials, and Albanian collaborators in the fall

³⁴ The UNPROFOR, Background, available [on-line]: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm, accessed 12 December 2004.

of 1997. These actions provoked revenge from the Serbian military against the Albanian population as a whole. Beginning in February 1998, Serbian police and paramilitaries backed by the Yugoslav Army (VJ) launched a campaign in the Drenica region east of Pristina, a hotbed of KLA activity. Open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes.³⁵ The crackdown transformed the KLA from a radical fringe group into a popular movement.³⁶ Besides provoking Serbian reprisals that would win them popular support, the KLA also hoped to draw international attention to their cause, and they were successful in that as well. Fresh from the experience of Bosnia and facing the prospect of yet another round of ethnic cleansing, NATO began *Operation Allied Force* air strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. In all, NATO aircraft flew over 37,000 sorties in the 78-day air campaign. At the end of the campaign, about 1,100 aircraft were participating, with the United States contributing about 725. Of the total aircraft, about 535 were strike aircraft, (U.S. 323/Allied 213). Thirteen of NATO's 19 nations contributed aircraft to the operation, with eight nations' aircraft flying combat missions.³⁷ After 11 weeks of intense air strikes, inflicting damage on Yugoslavia's infrastructure and its armed forces, President Milosevic agreed to a peace plan, based on NATO demands and a proposal from the Group of Eight countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia and Japan).³⁸

The war in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 and the NATO air campaign in 1999 caused extensive destruction. Besides, the Kosovo campaign underscored the "capability gap" between the United States and European nations in terms of military assets. The coalitional will and decisiveness were also questioned.

³⁵ NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>, accessed 12 December 2004.

³⁶ Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo*, October 2004, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War college, pp. 6-7, available [on-line]: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/PUB583.pdf>, accessed 14 December 2004.

³⁷ Steve Bowman, Kosovo and Macedonia: US and Allied Military Operations, April 24, 2002, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress.

³⁸ Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, Kosovo and US Policy, July 21, 2000, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, p. 2.

D. WAR ON TERROR

September 11th, 2001 showed that the world is no longer safe using the traditional military approaches. Four commercial airliners hijacked by 19 men using box cutters attacked the United States of America. Two crashed into the World Trade Center towers, one into the Pentagon, and a fourth in Pennsylvania. Casualties numbered approximately 3,000.

New challenges were introduced to nations' security by that tragic event. Governments had to review their ways of thinking about security. Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their availability for terrorists, and global terrorism per se became the most realistic threats to the security of nations.

As the result of the attack, the U.S. government declared the global war on terrorism.³⁹ Rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators were designated as the objectives to be achieved for victory. Destruction of Al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations, and the neutralization of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq were among the priority tasks for the United States. Addressing the U.S. Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush said "war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there."⁴⁰

Twenty-six days after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, operation "Enduring Freedom" was launched in Afghanistan. To date, 21 nations have deployed more than 16,000 troops to the U.S. Central Command's region of responsibility. In Afghanistan alone, coalition partners are contributing nearly 8,000 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, comprising over half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan.⁴¹

The impact of 11 September on the Alliance was immediate and direct. NATO allies took an unprecedented decision by agreeing to invoke Article 5 of the North

³⁹ George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002.

⁴⁰ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," United States Capitol, Washington, DC, September 20, 2001, available [on-line]: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, accessed 3 January 2005.

⁴¹ International Contribution to the War on Terror, US CENTCOM, available [on-line]: <http://www.centcom.mil/operations/Coalition/joint.htm>, last accessed 3 January 2005.

Atlantic Treaty. At the request of the United States, the NATO allies agreed to take certain measures, individually and collectively, to implement Article 5. As a result, for the first time in NATO's history, NATO assets were deployed in support of so-called "Article 5 operations". The allies agreed to send aircraft belonging to NATO's Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to the United States and Alliance naval forces were sent to the eastern Mediterranean. NATO-led forces in the Balkans have also acted against terrorist groups with links to the Al-Qaeda network. The Alliance has also increased its efforts to promote close cooperation to counter the threats posed by the use of WMD. However, it was stressed that suppressing terrorism will require a comprehensive, long-term effort comprising political, economic and diplomatic actions and law enforcement measures, as well as military tactics.⁴² The capability to address the risks is of great importance, but political and diplomatic means should be the main instruments against both terrorism and proliferation.

1. Operation Iraqi Freedom

In February 1991, a U.S.-led coalition of allied military forces expelled Iraqi forces that had occupied Kuwait in 1990. Several cease-fire agreements followed the termination of hostilities. However, Iraq had not fully complied with terms of these cease-fire agreements. Several Iraqi violations of cease-fire provisions occurred. Continuous Iraqi obstruction of U.N. weapons inspections led to their withdrawal in December 1998. Four days of air and missile strikes against Iraq by U.S. and British air force and naval units followed. A series of follow-on military clashes have occurred since 1998, as Iraqi air defense units have tried to target allied aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. After a brief break after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, military clashes between allied and Iraqi units intensified in 2002. On October 11, 2002, Congress authorized President Bush to use U.S. armed forces to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, and enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.⁴³

⁴² NATO Handbook, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0106.htm>, last accessed 3 January 2005.

⁴³ Alfred B. Prados, *Iraqi Challenges and U.S. Military Responses: March 1991 through October 2002*, November 20, 2002, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, p. 3.

On March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. U.S. troops were cooperating with some allied forces. The United Kingdom deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval task force, an armored task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade, a Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron. Australia deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special operations personnel, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft squadron. Poland had 200 special operations troops. Upon the completion of the “military operation” transition to the “stability operation” in the area, the willingness of other nations to contribute ground forces gained additional importance. Contributions with more than 1,000 troops were made by Poland, Spain (withdrew after the Madrid terrorist attacks on November 3, 2004), The Netherlands, Italy, and Ukraine. Other contributing nations include Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia.⁴⁴

September 11 and the U.S. Global war on terrorism affected the world and European community significantly. Following September 11, 2001, the EU struggled with whether to expand ESDP’s purview to include combating external terrorist threats or other new challenges, such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In June 2002, EU leaders agreed that the EU should develop counter-terrorism force requirements, but stopped short of expanding the Petersberg tasks. Increasingly, however, EU member states appear to recognize that the ESDP must have a role in addressing new challenges in order to remain relevant and to bolster the EU’s new, broader security strategy developed by the EU’s top foreign policy official, Javier Solana. The description of the Petersberg tasks in the text of the draft constitutional treaty states that “all of these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism.” Many analysts assert that once the draft treaty is finalized, this language would effectively expand the Petersberg tasks to include combating terrorism. In the wake of the March 11, 2004

⁴⁴ Steve Bowman, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, August 4, 2003, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, p.7.

terrorist bombings in Spain, EU leaders on March 25-26, 2004 announced a new “Declaration on Combating Terrorism.” Among other measures, it calls for “work to be rapidly pursued to develop the contribution of ESDP to the fight against terrorism.”⁴⁵

Western societies were quite supportive of the United States in the aftermath of 9/11. However, it was possibly the statement of U.S. senior political officials that from now on the mission would determine the coalition, and not vice versa⁴⁶ that provoked some anti-American sentiments in some nations of “Old Europe” (namely Germany and France). This statement meant that the United States would define the missions (war on terrorism, invasion of Afghanistan; the attack on Iraq, and so forth). NATO would be the toolbox for providing assets. Also, if there is no agreement in NATO to participate in a mission, bilateral arrangements would be concluded between willing nations in order to create the willing coalition. The case of Iraq became the breaking point. The United States declared the intention of the operation in Iraq, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, which was not exactly what the United States hoped for (it did not directly legitimate the war), and other ultimate-like resolutions were vetoed, in particular by France, Germany and Russia. The operation was started by the U.S. coalition, allied troops of Great Britain and the Polish SF. The split among the European nations took place at the same time. France and Germany opposed the U.S. decision, while new European democracies, in particular the “Vilnius ten” – Central and Southeast European nations, aspiring for NATO and EU membership, supported its decisions. Their support was not of any use militarily, but it allowed the U.S. leadership to claim that the international community approved the decisive actions.

Ukraine deployed its NBC protection battalion to Kuwait before the start of the operation. Ukraine was not intended to participate in the invasion directly, but willing to provide NBC protection to allied troops and population of Kuwait. A respective bilateral agreement was concluded between the governments of Ukraine and Kuwait. With the end

⁴⁵ For the text of the EU’s draft constitutional treaty, released in July 2003, see the website of the European Convention on the Future of Europe, available [on-line]: <http://europeanconvention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf>. Also see the text of the European Council’s Declaration on Combating Terrorism, March 25-26, 2004, available [on-line]: <http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/79637.pdf>, last accessed 4 February 2005.

⁴⁶ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire: The Near Death of the Transatlantic Alliance*, Brookings Institution Press, 2004, p. 1.

of the active (combat) phase of operation and the introduction of the stabilization phase, Ukraine deployed a brigade of some 1,600 servicemen to operate under the Polish division in the Polish Area of Responsibility. Ukrainians are still deployed in the area. However, the growing concerns among the population made the new government start discussions on the withdrawal of Ukrainians from Iraq. The withdrawal is to be planned carefully (not to be an escape), intended to leave empty spots, but use substitutions from local Iraqi security forces.

E. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICIES AND RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE

Russian foreign policy objectives towards Ukraine and the rest of the international community did not change significantly: maintaining Russia's diplomatic and security hegemony over the territory of the former USSR republics, enhancing Russia's "Great Power" status among internationals and at the same time avoiding clashes (direct confrontations or break of relations) with developed countries (G7, for instance). The period of 1991-1993 could be viewed as the period of romanticism (to some extent even pro-Western), since 1993 (and until now) Russia is conducting a more assertive and aggressive policy. During the first years of Yeltsin's presidency, Moscow cut off military aid to the Communist regime in Afghanistan, its combat troops were withdrawn from Cuba, Russia launched a reform program and won IMF membership, the START II Treaty was signed that would eliminate the core ICBMs of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, and radically reduced its force levels in many other categories. Later, its foreign policy became more assertive and nationalistic in many areas. However, cooperation with the West was still maintained. This could be a reaction to increased nationalist and communist successes in parliamentary elections, resentments over the West's "inadequate" response to Russia's earlier conciliatory approach, Western "responsibility" for Russia's economic distress, and Western indifference to Russian security concerns.

In 1999, President Yeltsin's surprise New Year's Eve resignation propelled the then-Prime-Minister into the Kremlin. During Presidential elections in March, Mr. Vladimir Putin was elected president with 52.5% of the vote in an 11-person field. His closest rival received just under 30% of the vote. Putin's priorities for policies were to be as follows: strengthening the central government, reviving the economy and integrating Russia into the global marketplace, strengthening the armed forces, and asserting

Russia's status as a great power.⁴⁷ Within time, his power gained more authoritarian features, for suppressing free media and taking it under control, and limiting the number of political parties or be registered by the government. Russia continued its policies directed towards maintaining its influence within its areas of interest: Moldova, Belarus, and the Caucasus. Recent reform introduced by Putin's government with the law on the replacement of privileges with cash benefits caused disappointment among the population, leading to a decrease in the presidential rating to about 65% (compared to a previous rating of 84%).⁴⁸

The United States and Russia are not in complete agreement over several issues, which include missile defense, the ABM Treaty, NATO enlargement, Chechnya, Iraq, Russian missile technology and nuclear reactor transfers to Iran, for example. However, U.S.-Russia relations were softened and improved after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Russia did not support the NATO enlargement to the East. For a long time since the end of the Cold war, NATO enlargement was believed by many Russian officials and the population as a potential threat to the national security of the country. These old stereotypes in Russian foreign policy are gradually decreasing. However, this process is long-term and resource-consuming. Despite the changes in both Russia and NATO criteria, used for assessing threats during the Cold War, Russia was very careful and, sometimes even, very suspicious of the process of NATO enlargement and its advance towards Russian borders.

The Kosovo crisis and the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 posed a serious dilemma for Moscow: how to oppose NATO's military action without provoking a confrontation with the United States and NATO Europe. The response was a combination of vehement rhetoric and limited action. Moscow relied on vigorous diplomacy to help defuse the conflict and demonstrate its status as a world power. During

⁴⁷ Stuart D. Goldman, *Russia*, February 1, 2002, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, p. 4.

⁴⁸ Poll Shows Putin's Rating Falls, *The Russia Journal*, Moscow, February 2, 2005, available [on-line]: <http://www.russajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=47275>, accessed 3 February 2005.

much of the conflict, Russia opposed NATO's terms for peace as too severe, but in the end, Russia joined U.S., NATO, and EU representatives in persuading Yugoslavia to accept a cease-fire on NATO's terms.⁴⁹

On March 2004, the Duma (Parliament) passed a resolution "In Connection with NATO Enlargement", which openly declared that in spite of partnership and cooperation between Russia and NATO on a wide range of directions, Russian parliamentarians reckoned that "NATO's military doctrine has an offensive character" and "the Alliance continues to press towards a global presence in different regions of the world and influence there by forceful means, passing over the UN". However, besides such strong negative statements,⁵⁰ there are also more moderate views. Statistics at the time of enlargement showed that 44% of Russian citizens believed that NATO enlargement towards Russian borders posed a threat to Russian national security. On the other hand, according to a survey by the respectable All-Russian Centre for Monitoring Public Opinion, 33% of respondents thought that the enlargement process did not contain any threat, 9% of this "positive" group supposed that it improved Russian security while 23% had no opinion. There is a certain percentage of military and representatives of intellectual elites who do not necessarily consider NATO enlargement as a threat to Russian security. Such divergent opinions about the process of NATO enlargement represent a very complicated picture of the Russian political, military and intellectual landscape.⁵¹

Russian policy towards its neighbors was reviewed as well. Russian officials came to an agreement that Russian dominance in this region is its highest foreign policy priority. Russian policy toward other CIS countries was tasked to promote further economic integration under Russian leadership, including a customs union and a payments union. Russia has also striven for a CIS defense alliance and Russian military

⁴⁹ S. Goldman, p. 7.

⁵⁰ Addressing the issue of NATO enlargement, Mr. Vladimir Vasiliev, the Head of Parliamentary Committee for Security mentioned, that majority of population perceives NATO enlargement as threatening to Russia. V. Vasiliev, Position: NATO-Russia Relations, May 25, 2004, available [on-line]: <http://www.vladimirvasiliev.ru/index.php?page=position&id=44>, accessed 3 February 2005.

⁵¹ Denis Alexeev, *NATO Enlargement: A Russian Outlook*, November 2004, Conflict Studies Research Center, UK, available [on-line]: <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Russian/04%2833%29-DA.pdf>, accessed 3 February 2005.

bases on the territory of other CIS states. However, the progress of CIS integration was limited. Russia and other CIS states imposed tariffs on each others' goods in order to protect domestic suppliers and raise revenue, in contravention of an economic integration treaty. CIS was criticized for the lack of progress on common concerns and Russian attempts at domination.

Still, a consistent Russian policy towards Ukraine was not developed. Perhaps the complicated structure of Russian domestic political elites could explain that fact. Tor Bukkvoll⁵² supposes that there are several explanations for that absence. For a rather long time, Ukrainian independence was viewed in Russia as a temporary event. Thus, developing specific strategies towards Ukraine at certain stages would mean recognizing independence and paying more attention to it than Russian elites were willing. Regular norms, applicable to the relations between two independent nations, were not applied between Russia and Ukraine. Russian influence over presidential elections in Ukraine in 1994 was significant through the financial support of candidates and media campaigns. The 1999 elections were more moderate. However, the 2004 campaign occurred once again under close Russian "attention".

Despite its ambitions to dominate the post-Soviet areas, Russia seems not to have sufficient tools to influence Ukraine. The few available options are the informal political and business networks, the Russian minority in Ukraine, and Ukrainian oil and gas dependency. The minority issue was never used seriously and will hardly ever be used. The business networks also seemed not to be used against Ukraine. These links were founded on economic interest as Russian businessmen are not willing to jeopardize business perspectives in order to achieve some political goals. The gas and oil issue is one of the most valuable of these tools. However, it is also not sufficient to significantly affect Kyiv in its political behavior, for instance, in the relations with NATO. The majority of Russian gas and exports is transited through the Ukrainian territory. Besides, use of the "gas and oil weapon" usually provokes serious arguments within the Russian political (and business) elite.

⁵² Tor Buckkvoll, *Off the Cuff Politics – Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukrainian Strategy*, Contemporary History Journal, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 8, 2001, 1141-1157.

Russia's future role as an energy superpower so far is undeniable. Russia would remain an energy superpower even in the event that Ukraine becomes a full member of the Euro-Atlantic community. Still, a large portion of CIS energy resources are in Central Asia, and a large part of its European transport infrastructure is in Ukraine. The Central Asian suppliers would be affected by the developments in Ukraine as well. Thus, resource producers, whatever the reason, be it superpower ambitions or pure economic dividends, consider Ukraine's position.

Russia's future role in Eurasia is undefined. The culmination of President Putin's CIS policy has been the Single Economic Space – Euro-Asian Economic Partnership (EEP), which was established not in order to complement the EU, but 'mirror' it on the basis of its own distinctive mechanisms, laws and standards. In February 2003, leaders of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan agreed to establish a single economic space. Objectives of the organization include the elimination of trade barriers, increase in trade and the creation of a favorable environment for the parties' accession in the World Trade Organization. Supranational coordinating responsibilities within the organization were delegated to Russia. The EEP is under development now, and Ukraine's position shifted from supportive to careful, requiring detailed revision of its role in the process and even its exclusion.

As a result, the EU has begun to realize that there is more than one integration process unfolding in Eurasia. However, without Ukraine, could the EEP survive, and why on earth should it? Would Russia's energies not be better focused on its biggest trading partner, the EU, and, instead of 'mirroring' it, would it not be better to complement it? Ukraine agreed to participate in the EEP, but only in its economic aspects and no political or military alliances would be created with the involvement of Ukraine.

Would Russia's role in Eurasia not also be challenged from a different quarter? The end of 2004 showed many citizens in CIS countries the new election process in Ukraine, combined with the image of a competent and self assured opposition, an increasingly resilient and determined civil society, presidential debates and even judges, electoral officials and police prepared to defy authority and uphold the law. There is great uncertainty as to what effect it may have on some CIS nations, such as Moldova, Belarus,

Armenia, and Kazakhstan. The possibility also arises concerning the emergence of real developed democracy in the CIS nations, and that would become a democratic model in the CIS per se. Russia's dominating role would be challenged by the equal partner role one day.

Russian President Putin established a strategic partnership with the United States, and a business led scheme of integration in the CIS. This emphasis on economics has set him apart from Russia's traditionalists and endeared him to Western economic 'liberals'. However, besides the traditionalists' approaches, Putin has a strong geopolitical view of the world and equates security with well defined 'zones of interest'. It is a focus that overlooks the real threats to security in the former USSR: the gulf between state and society, the arrogance of public authorities, the infirmity of public institutions, the criminalization of the state and the powerlessness and anger of ordinary people.⁵³

Changes in the world and at the borders of Russia (especially Western ones) had affected the Russian perception of its role in the world. Its position within CIS is gradually diminishing as the discrepancy between the CIS and the EU is increasing. Russia has to find its new niche in the international security system now that it is faced with an enlarged NATO and reviewed priorities of the world's leading nations. Russia remains a nuclear superpower. It is able to play an important role in determining the national security environment in Europe (Eastern European States, Ukraine and Moldova), the Caucasus, and Asia (former USSR republics, where Russian troops are involved in border security, drugs countering, and so forth). Russia could be cooperative, passive, or disruptive.

Perhaps, the new stage in Russia's foreign policy is about to start; the period of icebreaking, which would include some more sustained and functional relations with Ukraine (and other neighbors) as equals, but not as the areas of interest.

F. DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE

Upon the abolishment of Soviet jurisdiction and direct control of Moscow over major political, economic, and security issues, Ukraine's political system was attempting

⁵³ James Sherr, The Logic Behind Putin's Intervention in Ukraine, November 2004, Conflict Studies Research Center, UK, available [on-line]: <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/CEE/04%2835%29-JS.pdf>, accessed 3 February 2005.

to be build on principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. However, the reality was (or is) that it was the combination of democracy, some authoritarianism and oligarchy. Since 1991, Ukraine had several parliamentary elections and three presidential ones. In 1996, the new Constitution was adopted. In 1994, during the presidential elections, the power was peacefully changed from Leonid Kravchuk to Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma was reelected in 1999. These elections were contested to be not entirely transparent and fair and Moscow was accused of supporting the acting presidential campaign.

The period of the Kuchma presidency was characterized by pressure over the independent media by the government authorities. Under the constitution, Presidential authority in Ukraine is rather significant and is not limited (so far) by governmental or parliamentary levers. This allowed the President and the Presidential Administration to establish a network of presidential appointees at all levels, from top down. The President has the authority to appoint the Ministers of Defense, Interior, the heads of the intelligence agency and tax administration.⁵⁴ Several business “clans” (oligarchic groups) received some profitable concessions from Kuchma for backing his re-elections politically and financially (privatization of state-owned industries for minimal prices and without any competitions). Oligarchic groups have seats in parliament and they have their representatives in posts in government and other institutions.

Ukraine’s economic reforms have had rather modest success and were not aggressive enough to be completed entirely. Restructuring the economy was also successful to some degree. The agriculture and energy sectors still need significant reformation. Public administration is also underdeveloped and corrupted almost to the lowest levels.

The first increase in the GDP in Ukraine since its independence was registered in 2000. The GDP has continued to grow since then. However, the living standards for the majority of the population did not change and remained rather low. The presence of several oligarchic groups, maintaining the status quo situation, prevent some aggressive

⁵⁴ Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov, Report, *Civilian Control over the Law Enforcing Agencies in Ukraine*, National Security and Defense Journal, #4 (52), 2004, pp. 2-36.

economic reforms from being implemented. In addition, it should be added that official data does not include profits and the growth of the GDP and production “in shadow”.

Ukraine’s foreign policy seems to be the brightest page in Ukraine after 1998. The friendly and close relations with its neighbors and strategic partners, and organizations, such as NATO and the EU, founded during the first years of independence, continued to develop. Ukraine managed to avoid serious conflicts with Russia, which at least nominally, recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Still, Ukraine’s foreign policy is lacking political and economic backup. Despite the decision of the National Defense and Security Council on defining Euro-Atlantic integration as the strategic objective of Ukraine’s foreign policy (2002), the “multivectorness” of policy persisted to exist. Both Western and Russian interests are considered, depending on where the pressure comes at the time. Decisiveness in following the European vector is compensated by economic and other links with Moscow and some of its political leaders and oligarchs.

Several scandals unfolded in Ukraine during the last few years, undermining Ukraine’s achievement in the international arena. Opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze was murdered in the fall of 2000. The lack of progress in democratization and the market economy prevented Ukraine from developing firm and real cooperation with the EU, limiting it to proclamations and statements of mutual interests. Ukraine’s supplies of heavy armament to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001 during the internal ethnic conflict there was accepted as the violation of existing international agreements. The weapons sales were legal, followed by the signing of an agreement on military and military–technical cooperation between nations a year earlier, prior to the conflict unfolding, but the United States viewed them as potentially destabilizing. Finally, in 2002, based on records made in the office of the President Kuchma, he was accused in allegedly approving the proposed transfer of the Ukrainian “Kolchuga” air defense system to Iraq. This created another political scandal. Ukraine presented all information regarding the production and use of all “Kolchugas” ever made in Ukraine. However, the scandal subsided when Ukraine agreed to deploy its CBR-

protection unit to Kuwait in March-April 2003 during the campaign in Iraq. Later, Ukraine contributed a peacekeeping brigade to the stabilization efforts of the coalition force there.

The Presidential administration gradually filled the power vacuum, replacing Soviet-time vertical subordination to Communist Party authorities. Limited economic reforms were introduced, still allowing the economy to be under the control of the state or oligarchic groups affiliated with presidential administration. Multi-vector foreign policy was the most suitable for the government, allowing it to balance successfully between European and Russian economic and political interests, and avoiding any significant changes in its domestic political environment.

The most significant (“revolutionary”) change in Ukraine, affecting its domestic and foreign policies for several years in the future, was the Presidential election in the fall of 2004. The dominant people in the political sphere, Leonid Kuchma who due to the constitution is incapable of reelection for a third term and pro-presidential oligarchs offered acting Prime-Minister Victor Yanukovych as the candidate. His main competitor was the leader of the opposition, Victor Yushenko, viewed as a more pro-reform and pro-Western figure.

International and domestic observers found both the first and second round of the elections as not free and unfair. This includes the use of government-run media in favor of Yanukovych, the abuse of ballots of absentee voters, the expulsion of opposition representatives from regional electoral commissions, the pressure on students and government employees to vote for Yanukovych, and finally the falsifying of the vote counts. After the Central Electoral Commission announced the results, proclaiming Yanukovych as the winner, peaceful protests started in the capitol and all over Western Ukraine. Government offices in Kiev were blocked, opposition, supported by the people in the streets, appealed to the Supreme Court of Ukraine to recognize the results of the election as fraudulent. The court decided to repeat the second round of elections on

December 26, 2004. Results of the third election named opposition leader Victor Yushenko President of Ukraine. He received 51.99% of the votes versus his opponent's 44.20%.⁵⁵

Two political options, offered for Ukraine by the two candidates, differed on some key issues. The opposition was in favor of integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, the free market economy and reforms. The pro-government offer was less radical in terms of reformation, and allowed it to continue the policy, favorable to Russia dominance (within this Russian area of interest), "managed democracy" and oligarchic interests in the economy.

G. CONCLUSION

The end of the 20th century was rich in international processes and enlargements westwards from Ukraine. Ambitious Russian empire-oriented policies were not diminished, but rather were intensified due to the appearance of a more authoritarian type of government. Thus, the western vector of integration became more attractive for Ukraine in terms of economy, security, freedoms and democratic values. A corresponding decision was made by the National Defense and Security Council in May 2002, and approved by the President. Since that time, Ukraine actively participated in the war against terror, providing its territory for over flights, air refueling, and emergency landings for operation Enduring Freedom, and sending the largest non-NATO military contingent of 1,621 men to Iraq.⁵⁶

At the same time, relations with the Russia-dominated domain were intensified by the agreement of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to establish the Euro-Asian Economic Partnership. Ukraine agreed on participation in economic issues only, rejecting the possibilities of any military of supra-national (eventually Russia-led) institutions to be formed. That decision of the President of Ukraine came as a surprise to Parliamentarians, as well as to supporters of Ukraine abroad.

⁵⁵ Central Election Commission, Presidential Election 2004 Results, available [on-line]: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/elect/wp0011>, accessed 5 February 2005.

⁵⁶ For more information on the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent in Iraq, see "Ukraine in Peacekeeping operations: Iraq," available [on-line]: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=peacekeeping&lang=ua&sub=iraq>, accessed 5 February 2005.

Armed conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and unresolved disputes in Moldova require the continuous attention of the Ukrainian government to security issues. The Western choice, appearing to be an efficient solution, as far as European achievements in the security issues are concerned, gained during that rather short period of time, are significant. U.S. military capabilities are the most advanced currently. Using that experience, implementing the best features and the adoption to Ukrainian realities would be the most effective way of increasing state defense capabilities.

Changes in the government of Ukraine set the preconditions for the successful (or at least active) advance on the Western-integration direction. The revolutionary break with the past, as one of the requirements for democratic development, is finally now completed.. One of the serious challenges for the government at present is to find the balanced policy, allowing for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and at the same time, maintaining real partnership, but not dominant, relations with Russia.

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IV. EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION AS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF UKRAINE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A. INTRODUCTION

Unlike the Cold War era, changes in the geopolitical situation in Europe and around Ukraine during recent years, were dynamic. The EU and NATO enlarged eastwards and the Euro-Asian Partnership was founded to create another free-trade zone in the Euro-Asian terrains. These were a few of the major elements among others, creating the environment in which the Ukrainian “multi-vector” policy would no longer be beneficial. The issue of making a choice has currently gained significant importance. It is not simply the choice between East or West; it is rather the selection of different models of development. In broader terms, this would mean the creation of an Ukrainian identity within some regional structures, joining and sharing in some value systems, norms and standards, which are dominant either in the EU or in the EAP.

Ukraine has made its decision regarding its future international and security strategy. In May 2002, the National Defense and Security Council of Ukraine declared Ukraine’s intent to seek NATO membership in the future. This was one of the elements of the Euro-Atlantic choice of Ukrainian foreign policy. Years of hesitations and neutrality are over. Ukraine has finally defined its long-term objectives and priorities. Ukraine’s future is seen as being a developed democratic nation, in which the domestic economy is competitive and integrated into the world economy.

In 2002, the President of Ukraine addressed the Supreme Rada of Ukraine (Parliament) with the “European Choice” speech,⁵⁷ where he presented the geopolitical course of Ukraine. That course is towards European integration, in which the principal steps and mechanisms were also presented in the document.

The final objective of that European course was (and still is) to become a full member of the European Union. The European course is first of all the domestic issue and there should be a respective European identification of Ukrainian society, domestic

⁵⁷ Some reports of Ukrainian Media on this topic are in Internet media archives: available [on-line]: <http://www.expert.org.ua/2002/06/18/020618w2.shtml/>, <http://www.telegrafua.com/articles/1023698950264/>, accessed 3 February 2005.

transformations and reforms. European values should become Ukrainian values as well, Ukrainian institutions should meet the requirements of European ones, corresponding standards for economic, political and social developments are to be admitted and met. This is the kind of “homework” Ukraine must do in order to meet the objectives. A political will (decisiveness and will of government and politicians), and support from society are of a great importance in achieving these goals. The EU itself is another important element in Ukraine’s success on its path to Europe. Positive messages, assistance and support of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations would support Ukraine during the period of adjustment and reforms, while ignorance and the necessity to struggle on its own might cause the rise of Russia-disposed political forces, shifting Ukraine towards Eurasia, which is not the outcome that Ukraine would like. Europe might have far less positive outcomes from such a development as well.

NATO could be (and is) viewed as one of the elements of the “European strategy” of Ukraine. NATO membership is not just one of the steps towards Euro-Atlantic integration, but rather the locomotion of that strategy. Successes in Ukraine-NATO relations (and integration) can be proof of Ukraine’s intentions as well as its seriousness and decisiveness in achieving its objectives.

Since their election in November-December 2004, the new political leadership of Ukraine declared an ambitious Euro-oriented policy as the main choice of Ukraine. On February 21, 2005, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan to 2007 was signed in Brussels, Belgium, during the session of the EU-Ukraine cooperation council. As the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, stated:

Our (EU) proposals answer all Ukraine’s requests to boost our relationship in the short term. As to the longer term development of our partnership: as Ukraine makes genuine progress in carrying out internal reforms and adapting to European standards, relations between the EU and Ukraine will become deeper and stronger.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Ferrero-Waldner welcomes adoption of Ukraine Action Plan, Brussels, 21 February 2005, available [on-line]: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/bfw_210205.htm, accessed 3 February 2005.

During the session of the Ukraine-NATO commission, held on February 22, 2005, the President of Ukraine in his address stated Ukraine is ready for a new, more extensive level of Ukraine-NATO cooperation. Multi-vector foreign policy is over, European standards for policies, economy and social development are the main goals to be achieved, and the European vector is integral to the Euro-Atlantic cooperation.⁵⁹ In his address to the reporters, the President said that “Ukraine has made its position clear about joining the Membership Action Plan, at the same time it means that our country will also use the possibilities that are provided by the existing instruments for cooperation, meaning the Action Plan between NATO and Ukraine.”⁶⁰

Similar thoughts were expressed by the President of Ukraine the same day during the session of the European parliament. Ambitious plans envisage the possibility of starting the accession negotiations in 2007, if Ukraine is successful in its domestic developments, directed towards Europe.⁶¹

The implementation of these ambitious plans would require a lot of hard work. Despite its unpopularity among the population of Ukraine, NATO membership could become an important milestone on the path to Europe as 44% of Ukrainians support EU integration while 28% would oppose it. At the same time, only 15% support NATO membership, while approximately 48% would resist such a decision.⁶² Political decisiveness without great popular support was also the case of the Czech Republic, for instance, when due to insufficient public awareness, only approximately 5% of the population during the first poll agreed on NATO entry.⁶³

⁵⁹ Mr. Victor Yushenko, remarks at the Ukraine-NATO Council meeting, Official web-page of the President of Ukraine, available [on-line]: <http://www.president.gov.ua/activity/vstrech/327225645.html>, accessed 25 February 2005.

⁶⁰ Alliance ready to deepen partnership with Ukraine, Brussels, February 22, 2005, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/02-february/e0222b.htm>, accessed 25 February 2005.

⁶¹ Leonid Adamchuk, *President Yushenko in Europe*, Ukrainian Pravda, Brussels-Strasbourg, February 24, 2005, available [on-line]: <http://www2.pravda.com.ua/archive/2005/february/24/1.shtml>, accessed 25 February 2005.

⁶² Kyiv Institute Social Studies and “Democratic Initiatives” Fund, Poll Results, February 4-15, 2005, available [on-line]: <http://www.dif.org.ua/data/zip/2202052241.zip>, accessed 26 February 2005.

⁶³ Miroslav Lysina, Security Policy of the Czech Republic in Light of the Integration into the European Union, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 2003, p. 14 (reference #28).

B. WHY UKRAINE SHOULD BE ATTRACTIVE FOR EUROPE

Unlike relations with NATO, Ukraine-EU cooperation has not been so successful and promising. The first agreement between Ukraine and the EU (the European Community at the time) was concluded in May 1993 (On Trade and Textile Products). The legal base for cooperation was founded in 1994, when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was concluded and Ukraine was the first of the CIS countries to do so. PCA could be described as a kind of a road map for assisting in the introduction of economic and trade policies, which also presented a challenge for Ukraine in terms of adapting its legislation to meet the EU standards. PCA relied on the willingness of the Ukrainian government to implement it effectively as a part of its policies, not as an order with which to comply.⁶⁴ However, the Ukrainian government seemed not to be willing to implement the PCA fully, while the EU nations took four years to ratify the PCA with Ukraine. This could be construed as evidence of mutual *de facto* indifference, while *de jure* parties recognized and welcomed the European aspirations of Ukraine. The EU was not ready to send a positive signal to Ukraine due to the failure of PCA requirements.⁶⁵

The idea to gain an associate member status was introduced in 1998 with the “Strategy for Ukraine Integration into the EU”, and the “EU Common Strategy of Ukraine” was developed later. The Common Strategy created an environment in which Ukraine could “align” itself with EU foreign and security positions, but it was not an institutional mechanism to invite Ukraine to align with the EU directly. Neither Ukraine nor the EU was ready for such a step. Dr. Moroney also concludes, that “most significant obstacles to EU-Ukraine relations are not only economic and political, but also psychological,”⁶⁶ because EU officials continue to link Ukraine with Russia (“consciously or unconsciously”) and the EU in general still lacks a clear vision on Ukraine. Several parties had some trade disputes. Ukraine kept taking some protectionist measures, while the EU imposed quotas and restrictions on Ukrainian textiles, and almost

⁶⁴ Dr. Jennifer Moroney, *EU-Ukrainian Relations: Prospects and Possibilities*, Conflict Studies Research Center, MoD UK, 16 July 2003, p. 109, available [on-line]: <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/CEE/>, accessed 14 August 2004.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 107-112.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 112.

closed its markets to Ukrainian steel and chemicals. EU financial assistance to Ukraine was far less than expected. Due to all these developments, Ukraine hardly was considered as a member of the EU in the near future.

Someone might ask – so what? What is the big deal? If Ukraine wants and is ready – let it join. If not – well, we are sorry, there are standards to be met. The answer to such question could be that Ukraine wants, but requires assistance and support from the European community. Why should Europe support Ukraine?

Territorially, Ukraine is the largest European state. Its labor, agricultural, industrial potential and resources could be of use to Europe. Its military could be a reliable partner and contributor to peace and stability operations in the region. Also, it is just better to have a stable developed democracy in the vicinity of the European borders. Incorporated into Euro-Atlantic community, Ukraine can facilitate the Alliance's transition from the defensive doctrine on the European continent, but it also could become a platform, assisting the United States and Europe in dealing with the instability and threats emerging in the Middle East.

Ukraine can become a model for “Europeanization” for other Eurasian (former Soviet) nations, in particular for Russia. In turn, it can be a source of expertise for Westerners on the issues of transition. Every state is unique in its transitional path. To some extent, Ukraine is more unique than other new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states and even Romania and Bulgaria could gain some time in implementing its European ambitions. In turn, dealing with these nations, Europe could gain some time for developing its decisions, common views and policies towards them. Ukraine would definitely have to start Euro-integration processes and reforms on its own. However, unsupported and painful, it could lead to an increase in Euro-skepticism and Russia-oriented trends in policies.

Ukrainian identity is currently under formation. It is not about the language. Ukrainian and Russian are widely spoken. Ukrainian is the official state language, and Russian is not suppressed. People speaking different languages consider themselves “Ukrainians”. It is not about the culture or religion. Due to its history, Ukraine comprises

a wide spectrum of traditions and religions, ranging from Polish and Austria-Hungarian, Catholic in the West, Ukrainian Orthodox in the Central regions, Russian Orthodox in the East, and Muslims in the South. What is most important is that these differences do not lead to serious conflicts. Ukrainian identity (ethnicity) is rather about values. Having these values with those shared by European nations would be a significant contribution towards developing Ukraine in a civilized European manner. Some Ukrainians did have the possibility to see these values in action. Others did not. The European community can play a significant role in its support of Ukraine in that process.

Ukrainian internal euro-skepticism and enhanced Euro-Asian vector would provoke the decrease of European interest towards Ukraine. The EU most likely would suspend its international intentions, and thereby, limiting its policy towards Ukraine by the “eternal neighborhood”. The strict separation line between Ukraine and the EU community would be through customs regulations as well as enhanced border security. Besides, increasing affiliations towards autocratic-type rule among the EAP states (Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan) challenges Ukraine’s democratic developments.

Ukraine could bridge Europe and Asia (through big Eurasian Russia). The “Open” and operating bridge would be the European path towards Asian resources, while Asian nations would have access to Europe through Ukraine, developed enough to be European, but still linked closely with others. The “Closed” bridge would be senseless and provide no benefit to anyone.

To ensure Ukraine’s successes in its Euro-Atlantic journey, the EU would be of great use to reconsider relations with Ukraine in a more positive aspect, recognizing Ukraine as an integral European nation-state. There is a need for a new definition of “Europe” including Ukraine.

Indeed, quite frankly if someone had asked me five years ago - in 1997 for example - when I was serving in the State Department under Secretary Albright and responsible for NATO enlargement whether I would be content and consider Europe “complete” if we succeeded in bringing in all the countries from the Baltics to the Black Sea into NATO and the EU, I suspect that I along with many colleagues would have said yes - because our and their mental image of what Europe meant ended somewhere around the Polish-Ukraine border. But today, building on our successes of the last decade, it may be time to again recast and expand our definition of

Europe to explicitly include and work for the perspective of Ukraine - just like many of us worked to recast and expand our definition of Europe a decade ago to firmly include Central and Eastern Europe.⁶⁷

Thus, a positive signal of acknowledging Ukraine's EU membership aspirations, continuing to encourage Ukraine in inter-European forums to overcome the belief that Ukraine will never be a part of "Europe", would be the serious support needed for the Ukrainian government during the implementation of reforms in Ukraine. The period of the dormant European policy towards Ukraine should soon be over.

C. WHY NATO IS ATTRACTIVE FOR UKRAINE?

1. Defense Area

Since the beginning of the development of state institutions in a newly independent environment, Ukraine did not have a clear target model for transformation. This is particularly true for its military organization, where the Soviet model was still used for the development of its Armed Forces. The first Ukrainian strategic level documents, "The Foundations of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" (1993) and the "Concept of the National Security of Ukraine" (1997), were drafted soon after independence. These were rather good documents in terms of a first exercise in drafting strategic level conceptual documents, but their value was very limited because of their largely declarative nature. They generally reflected the euphoria and inexperience of the first years of independence. Besides, there was no reliable implementation system to force executive structures to follow these documents, which led to the gap between the documents' theses and real practices in security areas. At least these documents defined the strategic basics to include the non-nuclear, nonaligned status of the country and its general interest in European integration and building cooperative relations with the United States. However, they certainly were too general to provide clear strategic guidance for Ukrainian planners on policy priorities and allocation of resources.

Later, the experience of reforming the military, based in no small part on the useful examples of other countries including the United States, plus changes in the global and regional security environment, brought about new national strategic guidance, as well

⁶⁷ Ronald D. Asmus, A Strategy for Integrating Ukraine into the West, Conflict Studies Research Center, MoD UK, April 2004, p. 8, available [on-line]: <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/CEEiO4%2806%29-RDA.pdf>, accessed 15 August, 2004.

as a new national military strategy. The new “State Program for Reform and Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine,” adopted in 2000, made significant steps in defining the priorities of defense reform to include the creation of a Joint Rapid Reaction Force, gradual abolition of conscription and a shift to manning on a contract basis, and improving the reserve structure.

The overall defense potential of the state is rather low. Still, the defense structures are oversized, especially in terms of command and control, and support elements, and resource-consuming. There are serious difficulties with the utilization of excessive and outdated armament and ammunitions. Due to limited recourse allocation, the training programs are also limited, and the main emphasis is on the Rapid Reaction Forces as the key element of the defense structure. The war-time economy plans are hardly even identified or developed.

NATO entry would not necessarily improve these troubles immediately. However, steps towards Alliance membership would seriously contribute to the enhancement of Ukraine’s security. Thus far, NATO is the only operational and stable security organization in the region and world-wide.

The plan is to have the Ukrainian military be sufficient defensively to react to low-intensity (armed conflict) or middle-level (local war), as well as participate in international operations, and ensure total mobilization in case of high-intensity conflicts (regional war).⁶⁸ In the case of conflicts of any type escalating within the vicinity of the Ukrainian borders, NATO military support for Ukraine would be of great value. The presence of security risks around Ukraine and within Europe challenges the ability of any nation to counter them alone. NATO membership would increase the military security of Ukraine, allowing it to focus on other important issues of state reforms, especially in the area of the economy.

⁶⁸ The Military Doctrine of Ukraine do not envisage major global wars as a threat to the national security. Regional and local wars are defined as more possible threats. Military Doctrine of Ukraine was approved by the President of Ukraine on June 15, 2004 (#648/2004), available through: <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi>.

2. Political-Military Area

NATO nations share the same values and interests pertaining to the developed democracies. European societies possess similar democratic values and interests. The implementation of these values (real and not declarative) on the path to NATO would “prepare” Ukrainians to be members of the European family and live by democratic European rules.

NATO provides a forum to settle any international disputes between the members by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.⁶⁹ NATO members are committed to develop and strengthen free institutions, peaceful and friendly international relations, promote conditions for stability and well-being, as well as to encourage economic collaboration between members. Access to such a forum would provide additional security and political guarantees for Ukraine, as well as stipulate its economic development and collaboration with other allies.

NATO entry would require modifications in judicial and legislative areas domestically and internationally. The introduction of NATO/Western operational principles into some domestic activities would make the shifts towards European standards smoother. The modifications of administration agencies, the creation of security documents at new levels, improvements in the decision-making processes would all be eventually useful for further European advancement.

The words “NATO standards” are often used to speculate about NATO membership and Ukrainian progress in that area. The main standards in that regard should be viewed as maintaining a sustainable system of democratic values, the freedom of speech, an independent judicial branch, equal opportunities for competition, and a decrease in the “shadow economy” within the state. Thus far, these areas are the most problematic in Ukraine.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, April 1949, Article 1.

⁷⁰ Anatoliy Grishenko, Minister of Defense of Ukraine, *Interview to the “Interfax-Ukraine,”* March 2005, available [on-line]: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=ua&part=appearance&sub=read&id=4885>, accessed 17 February 2005.

In terms of the military, meeting NATO standards means the ability to cooperate and be interoperable with NATO allies in joint operations. The military structure of Ukraine, as well as law-enforcing and security institutions, are far from corresponding to NATO standards entirely. However, Ukraine has experienced the successful participation in the “Partnership for Peace Program”, as well as the ability to be operationally compatible with NATO nations within 2-3 years. The example of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the most recent new NATO allies shows that the complete interoperability of all the systems is not the decisive factor. Gaps in the Air Force and Air Defense systems and equipment, for instance, were compensated for by the nation’s commitments to the development of democracy and stability.

To a great extent, the security of Ukraine depends on stability (security) on global, European and regional (territorial) levels. Thus, the security measures, preventing the escalations of the security risks, should be applied at all levels. In fact, global security rests largely upon the United States (the only superpower) and the other members of G-8 club, as well as the international institutions, which exercise authority and influence in the world. These institutions include the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, IMF, and the World Bank. European security arrangements derive from the same institutions, but at a lower level.

By stabilizing its political and economic systems, Ukraine would promote stabilization and security at the lowest regional level. By achieving positive results in that process, advancement to the next, European level, would be possible. NATO membership could be the test of the nation’s capabilities prior to integration in the European Union. The national security system, compatible with a European one, should be established by that time, which would include truly civilian-controlled and professional Armed Forces. By achieving this, Ukraine would be able to contribute to the regional, European, and to some extent, to global security.

D. COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (CESDP OR ESDP)

The ESDP is the integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. One of the goals of the EU, defined in the Treaty of the European Union of 1990 (Maastricht Treaty), is “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the

implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”⁷¹ ESDP is the tool, allowing for the implementation of CFSP goals and objectives.⁷² Using the ESDP, the European Union intends to enhance and improve its ability to maintain peace and international stability and not limit itself to the European continent only. Assets and tools for dealing with the “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian-relief operations) were defined as a primary objective to be achieved. The ultimate objective was to develop the capacity to operate in a crisis in which NATO was not involved. The operation of the EU in Kosovo is one of the results of the ESDP.

Accession to the EU will introduce Ukraine to an entire new security community, not only in the military arena (so far NATO is the basic security guarantee of the EU), but also to economic stability and prosperity. The principles of ESDP are voluntary, which provides some additional advantages to the candidate states. There is no need to take part in operations if the nation troops are not adequately trained or prepared. There is also no need to assign any part of its Armed Forces to the supranational standing pan-European military. ESDP transparency promotes mutual confidence and trust, and provides the opportunities for cooperation with EU and NATO countries, which possess a significant amount of experience.

Eventually Ukraine could be involved in operations within the ESDP format. Despite the fact that European security arrangements are not duplicating NATO ones, their principles are similar to NATO to some extent. Still, NATO methods and approaches are more developed and robust. Besides, NATO has certain methods of working with new member states. Certain experiences in operating in the coalition (alliance) environment, overcoming the status of “new member state” and the transition to “full member” would be of great value for Ukraine in its European advancement. Familiarization with the principles of the ESDP operation would be another positive element. Thus, there would be the possibility for Ukraine to think over its possible offer to the EU, and decide on which capabilities should be improved (intensively or gradually)

⁷¹ Treaty on the European Union, Title 1 – Common Provisions, Article B, available [on-line]: <http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title1.html>, accessed 24 February 2005.

⁷² Objectives of the CFSP are outlined in Title V of the same treaty, Article 1

for better involvement. Preliminary cooperation within the ESDI and ESDP frameworks would allow for better understanding of perspectives for reform and the modernization of the national military in a broader, European-wide framework, as well as the utilization of European experience and tested methods.

E. NATO AND EU REACTIONS ON UKRAINE'S INTEGRATION AMBITIONS, POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN-RUSSIA COOPERATION

Ukraine alone would not be able to fulfill its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Integration processes involve at least two parties: the willingness to integrate and willingness to accept the integration. Facing two potential areas of integration (or perhaps accession would be the better word), NATO and the EU, the reaction of these organizations should be considered as well, outlining Ukraine's future foreign and security policy.

It is worth mentioning that Ukraine has never perceived NATO as the threat to its security (unlike Russia). Since concluding the Charter of Distinctive partnership with NATO in 1997, Ukraine developed the most extensive programs of cooperation with NATO compared to other former CIS states. In turn, developing new responsibilities of NATO outside Europe require new capabilities in the strategic air-lift. In 2003, Ukraine and NATO signed the Memorandum on Strategic air lift. Several NATO nations used Ukrainian aircraft to deploy their troops and equipment to the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan. Cooperation between NATO and defense institutions of Ukraine is the most extensive, compared to the other state institutions and agencies, so far being a kind of locomotive, pushing "European choice" declarations to some level of implementation.

NATO allies are more willing to see Ukraine among themselves. Heads of the defense ministries of the "Visegrad Group" (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) during the meeting with their Ukrainian counterparts stated "Ukraine is integral part of European community, and their respective countries will facilitate Ukraine's integration to Euro-Atlantic structures."⁷³ Besides, the most influential player, the United States, can provide an additional impetus to the decision-making process. The Ukraine-

⁷³ Press-release on the official visit of the Defense Minister of Ukraine to the Republic of Poland, Press-service of the Ministry of defense of Ukraine, Warsaw, March 4, 2005, available [on-line]: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=ua&part=news&sub=read&id=4894>, accessed 23 February 2005.

NATO Action Plan, which largely resembles the Membership Action Plan, is under implementation in Ukraine for the second year. This is one of the solid steps towards NATO, also supporting NATO commitments towards Ukraine.

Unlike NATO, the EU currently is more cautious regarding Ukraine. Partly Ukraine is to be blamed for the faults in establishing close friendly relations and extensive cooperation, as far as the CIS relations were intensified after the re-election of Leonid Kuchma to a second term. Ukrainian officials were appointed to head several CIS institutions (President of Ukraine and the Minister of Foreign Affairs), while Ukraine is not, in fact, a CIS member, but an associate.

The Treaty of the European Union, granting the right of any European state to apply for membership, in fact, faces difficulties with its implementation towards Western CIS states. There are no ambitious EU international plans towards Ukraine or Moldova, another nation aspiring to EU membership. At the same time, Russian foreign policy would like to see these nations within the area of its interests. Some proof of a Russian ambitious foreign policy towards its neighbors (“near abroad”) is Russian support of unrecognized, by international society, Transdniestrian authorities in Moldova, allowing it to keep its military bases in the area and influence polices of the state. The EU seems not to be eager to incorporate these former USSR republics in it in order not to provoke anti-EU sentiments in Russia. At the same time, the “open-door” policy is easily applied to the Western Balkans nations, although they have a long way to go towards membership. Both regions geographically and equally belong to Europe.⁷⁴ Is that the “clash of civilization” type aftereffects, influencing some European perceptions that Europe ends where the borders of the former USSR begin?

Ukraine officially stated that the goal of its foreign policy is to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, with the priority given to the European Union, in 1998 and declared the intention to join NATO in the future perspective in 2002. “EU officials have acknowledged Ukraine’s aspiration and have underlined the importance attached to a “democratic, stable, open and economically successful Ukraine”, they have been

⁷⁴ Taras Kuzio, EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004? European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2003, p. 21.

reluctant to state officially that Ukraine would be welcome in the EU even if it met certain conditions, the so called Copenhagen Criteria for membership.”⁷⁵ To this should be added the necessity to develop a strategy to deal with Russia, needed to establish and sustain Western “cohesion and consensus, to protect the aspiring country as well as to preserve an overall positive and cooperative Western-Russia relationship.”⁷⁶

Russia believes that NATO enlargement eastwards creates threats on its border. The EU is not perceived so aggressively. However, the reality is that the threats do not exist. NATO can ensure that there would not be any aggressive European nation, such as a Napoleonic France or Hitler's Germany, threatening Russian security from its Western border. Besides, following September 11, the United States and its allies have contributed to the reduction of the threats to Russia on its Southern border by defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan and conducting a NATO-led peace keeping mission there.

Ronald D. Amus offers several policies, available for Western society to cope with Russia in terms of enlargement eastwards and incorporating new members.⁷⁷ The first is to simply ignore Russian reactions. Something similar to the “Nike” slogan - “Just do it”. The idea behind the option is that it is not possible to just overcome Russian reservations by persuasion and diplomacy, and thus, it is better to quickly and quietly create new realities, making Russia face them and build a new relationship. As soon as Moscow accepts this new reality, its views will change and it will become more accommodating. The second option is the “dual track strategy”, used during the 1990s when NATO and the EU enlarged to include Central and Eastern Europe. This option covers both NATO and the EU and would develop integration plans for Ukraine in parallel with support and assistance to Moscow in order to create a parallel, cooperative relationship. It would not be an attempt to buy off or quiet Moscow in some crude fashion, but proof of recognizing Russian concerns. It would be not only Ukraine’s going

⁷⁵ James Sherr, *The Enlargement of the West & The Future of Ukraine*, Conflict Studies Research Center, MoD UK, 2002, pp. 10-12, available [on-line]: <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/CEE.pdf>, accessed 12 August 2004.

⁷⁶ Ronald D. Asmus, *A Strategy for Integrating Ukraine into the West*, Conflict Studies Research Center, MoD UK, April 2004, p. 10, available [on-line]: <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/CEF/04%20S06%29-RDA.pdf>, accessed 15 August 2004.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

West, but also its pull for Russia to follow the example. The third option is to take the cooperation (integration) activities with Ukraine once it has negotiated an understanding with Russia, which decreases the risk of any confrontation or harsh retaliatory steps against the West. The first option may irritate Russians, while the third option may provide them with additional impetus to stall. These would be the Western solutions, but the solution and a strategy are required.

What is also important is to differentiate between Russian and Ukrainian agendas. Russia does not seek EU membership while Ukraine does. Russia wants to be recognized as a great power (regional) whereas Ukraine does not. Russia is less interested in the EU “common values” approach and its policies towards the EU and NATO are similar, concentrate on strategic partnership. The major issue for the EU to consider in the case as to whether they can agree to have Ukraine inside the EU while Russia stays outside. Thus far, NATO respects these different agendas and is not excluding Ukrainian membership in the alliance, but welcomes it.

The role of the United States should not be underestimated during the process of Ukraine’s anchoring and integration with the West. By taking the lead through NATO, it can make it easier for the EU to move forward as well. The United States could take a leading role in solving the issue of Russia, both via its role in NATO as well bilaterally in its relations with Moscow. The experience of enlargement with Central and Eastern European nations of the 1990s showed that Washington could use its political muscle and much smaller levels of assistance, and be a significant catalyst and force pushing for internal pro-democratic reforms.

F. UKRAINE’S POLICY TOWARDS NATO (OPTION)

Imagine that one day, sooner or later, NATO and Ukraine would find it more attractive to be full-scale partners, and enjoy membership rather than Distinctive Partnership or Intensified Dialogue. Considering the decisiveness of the new government of Ukraine to execute the policy towards European integration, eventually the issue on what is the actual way to Europe would arise. It seems that the experience of all new EU members in this regard is revealing. NATO first, and then EU membership, and not vice versa. The Ukrainian way to Europe would also go through NATO membership. What

should the foreign (defense) policy of Ukraine be in the case of NATO membership? Should it be reviewed or changed, in comparison to the current one? If yes, in what way?

The policy of “deterrence-reassurance” is one of the possible options, which is worth considering. The Nordic NATO Nations, Denmark and Norway, rather successfully implemented that type of policy back in 1980. Perhaps, the analogy of the security situation during those times and existing (or possible future) security challenges differ. However, some rationality could be drawn.

The era of the Cold War and the presence of two antagonistic blocks (NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact) influenced the security environment of the Nordic nations of Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark. The nations’ initial idea, generated close to the end of World War II, due to its traditional and cultural affiliations, was to have its own mutual defense commitments or something similar to a Nordic Alliance. However, the non-allied status and policy of Sweden and the neutrality policy of Finland prevented the creation of such an alliance.

The bilateral partnership of Denmark and Norway, without the support of larger and stronger nations seemed to make less sense, especially in light of the growing military potential of the Soviet Union on the Kola Peninsula. Thus, the NATO membership and backup of allies was the best solution for such a security problem.

However, Danish and Norwegian membership in the Alliance was slightly special. The adopted policy of “deterrence-reassurance” comprised two components. The first one, the “*deterrence*”, envisages reliance on national defense capabilities (national Armed Forces and NATO reinforcement). “Reassurance” means non-provocative, unilateral confidence-building measures. In the case of Denmark and Norway, “reassurance” included the “prohibition of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on their respective territories, restriction on national and allied military operations on Nordic NATO territory, designed to lower “provocativeness” of Danish and Norwegian security activities.”⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Richrd A. Bitzinger, Denmark, Norway, and NATO: Constrains and Challenges, Rand Corporation, 1989, p. V.

The “Soviet” threat has gone. However, there is another actor in the international arena, whose attitudes are not necessarily constrained, but can affect some security decisions: the Russian Federation. Relations between Russia and NATO are not so encouraging, as they are between NATO and other former Soviet or Eastern European states. Russia joined the PfP program in 1994. It was officially recognized in 1997 that Russia and NATO are not adversaries.- The Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed that year, officially stating that the parties “share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation.”⁷⁹ The Kosovo crises and the NATO campaign caused cooperation to cease between Russia-NATO in the Permanent Joint Council in a number of areas.

Russia is concerned with the Eastern enlargement of NATO approaching the borders of Russia due to the Baltic States joining NATO. The matter of concern is the possibility of the deployment of nuclear armaments as well as the possibility of uncontrolled stockpiling of conventional armaments on the territories of new NATO members. The Baltic States are not participants in the CFE Treaty, and thus are not the objects of verification activities.

In the case of Ukraine joining NATO, Russia concerns might extend further. The policy of “reassurance” might have a positive role in such a case. The issue of nuclear arsenal redeployment is no longer as vital. There are no such significant threats and targets that should be engaged with nuclear armaments, especially in the European theater.

The issue of not stationing foreign troops (NATO) on Ukrainian territory is entirely negotiable. With its existing military capabilities and manpower, downsized and more efficient in the future, Ukraine should be able to counter the conflicts of different intensities within its borders (on one strategic direction), at the same time expecting to be reinforced by partners’ forces. In addition, Ukraine is not considering any nation (including neighboring ones) as its potential adversary. Security threats, presented in its military doctrine, are largely related to the economy, global terrorism, international

⁷⁹ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/fndact-a.htm>, accessed 27 February 2005.

crime, and so forth. Reliance on only a military response for those challenges is limited. At the same time, the issue of the Russian Black Sea fleet in Crimea is not entirely resolved. The current arrangement plans for the stationing of the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol until 2017. At the same time, Russian Defense Minister Sergii Ivanov states that currently Russia has no plans to redeploy its Black Sea fleet elsewhere.⁸⁰

Limiting the number of military NATO, NATO-led (PfP and in the spirit of PfP) exercises would not necessarily bring additional security guaranties to the area. Recent history of Ukraine's participation in NATO and PfP exercises includes 24 events in 2003, 15 exercises in 2004, Ukraine annually hosts several NATO and in the spirit of exercises, for instance, "Peace Shield" and "Sea Breeze", several bilateral exercises, Ukrainian participation in NATO exercises such as "Cooperative Partner", "Combined Endeavor" and others, which became traditional.

Thus far, this extended involvement was not of great concern to Russia with a few exceptions during the very first years of Ukraine-NATO cooperation. Further reduction of Ukraine's joint activities does not seem to be useful or provide additional security assurances.

Besides Russian concerns, limited "visible" involvement would be beneficial in keeping public opinion from escalating into anti-NATO feelings. The absence of uniformed foreigners in large numbers would prevent possible Ukrainian-foreigner negative contacts (conflicts). Thus, for an average Ukrainian civilian, NATO membership would mean changes and improvements in domestic militarized structures, participation in some international exercises as well as additional security guaranties. In the case of Ukraine's participation in NATO military operations, it also includes not necessarily an extra burden, but rather additional international military obligations; similar to what is executed now by Ukraine in Kosovo, Lebanon, Sierra-Leone, Liberia, and Iraq.

Continuing discussions between the United States and European nations on security issues, when Europeans and Americans are not in agreement, have certain implications for countries belonging to the so-called "New Europe" or developing

⁸⁰ Russia Does Not Plan to Redeploy Black Sea Navy Base, Interfax, Moscow, August 12, 2003, available [on-line]: http://www.interfax.ru/r/B/0/2.html?id_issue=5653228, accessed 27 February 2005.

democracies category. Two strategic partners and influential players in the international arena require decisions be made, which are rather difficult and sensitive. In the case of Ukraine, when the issue of balancing between options would occur, it would be useful to consider the extent to which the pure interests of the parties are involved, to what extent the threats are overestimated (exaggerated), and if possible, to make a careful analysis (distinction) between global interests, institutional ones (the European Union or NATO), and individual U.S. concerns.

Trans-Atlantic tension is not a development which Ukraine would like to see. Both parties in the discussion are important for Ukrainian security concerns. Thus, Ukraine, currently participating in the U.S.-led operation in Iraq, should also provide more weight to the capabilities for participation in the EU and NATO operations dealing with regional security issues.

G. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ON THE WAY TO NATO AND EUROPE?

It is very important to use the available time and resources effectively, although there is no specific timeline defined for the integration. Active participation in NATO and EU activities should continue. The NATO-Ukraine Action plan, adopted at the Prague Summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Governments,⁸¹ is one of the fundamental documents, which is the foundation of future close relations between Ukraine and NATO. EU *Auquis communautaire* has to be on the “waiting list” for implementation.

The Plan contains specific goals and objectives for a wider range of areas, covering political and economic issues, information issues, security, defense and military issues, information protection and security, and legal issues. In order to concentrate efforts, annual target plans are developed, specifying several areas of priority. Potential partners for these proffered directions are designated among NATO nations. Besides, it could be the bilateral arrangements with states, possessing a valuable experience, or regional (sub-regional) coalitions. This is the task of the new European-oriented foreign policy, and as an element of such, a strategy for military (defense) cooperation.

⁸¹ Ukraine-NATO Action Plan, Prague, November 22, 2002, available [on-line]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b021122a.htm>, accessed 3 March 2005.

The proposals for future domestic, foreign, and security policies included among others:

- strengthen democratic and electoral institutions;
- promote the continued development and strengthening of civil society, the rule of law, promoting fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens;
- strengthen civilian and democratic control over the Armed Forces and the entire Security Sector;
- fight corruption, money laundering and illegal economic activities, through economic, legal, organizational and law-enforcement measures; take the necessary steps to be removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) non-compliance list, in particular, by passing and implementing a law that meets FATF standards;
- update Ukraine's foreign and security policy to reflect its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration;
- reform State security structures to reflect the Euro-Atlantic Policy of Ukraine;
- be a key contributor to regional stability and security, including enhancement of Ukraine's contribution to international cooperation on conflict settlement and peacekeeping;
- sustain and enhance participation in the appropriate Peacekeeping Operations; further develop civil-military relations;
- enhance participation in the international fight against terrorism, including full implementation of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and participation in measures foreseen in the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism;
- improve public understanding of NATO through NATO-Ukraine cooperation in the field of information, including through cooperation with the NATO Information and Documentation Centre (NIDC).

In the area of defense and national security in particular:

- reorganize the Armed Forces of Ukraine into a well-trained, well-equipped, more mobile and modern armed forces able to cope with the challenges of security risks, to protect the territory of the State and to contribute to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions under the auspices of international organizations;
- strengthen civil control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other security forces, including enhanced cooperation and oversight of Parliament and increased participation of civilians in decision-making related to security issues;

- strengthen state structures to better reflect challenges highlighted by non-military and asymmetrical threats.

Achieving the objectives and the goals of the Plan would promote the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the market economy, helping Ukraine achieve a far-reaching transformation of the defense and security sectors, and taking it several steps closer to Europe.

H. CONCLUSION

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has achieved certain advantages on the path towards democratization. Compared to Russia or CIS Asian states, Ukraine has made considerable progress. At the same time, it is far less than was achieved by the Baltic States and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Dr. Taras Kuzio argues that, in that respect, Ukraine's record is comparable in many respects to that of Romania. Although there are few doubts in Western Europe that Romania is a part of Europe, the same is not applicable to Ukraine so far.

The accession process for the most recent enlargement included the nations developing "common EU values". However, the process is not entirely completed. These were the aspirations of European membership, supported by the EU to positively impact those nations. The EU and NATO membership should be the "golden carrot" for Ukraine in pursuing its reforms on the path to developing democracy. Both Ukraine and the EU must solidify their respective policies and shift them to real activities versus declarations.

In that regard, membership in Euro-Atlantic security structures would be additional substantiation of Ukraine's seriousness and would also allow Ukraine to increase the degree of its security. NATO membership, by increasing the military security of Ukraine, would allow it to concentrate on other important issues of state reforms, especially in the area of the economy. Cooperation within the NATO format, and eventually with the democratic community of the EU, would significantly contribute to the strengthening of domestic political and economic stability, and provide new opportunities for cooperation in different security spheres.

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V. CONCLUSION

Since the very first day of emergence as an independent nation, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had the difficult task of calling itself a reliable partner and player in the international arena. At the same time, economic prosperity, the rule of law, freedom of speech and respect for human rights were among the major objectives of its internal policy. Certain achievements were made, but much still remains to be done.

The first period of developing Ukrainian foreign policy could be identified by the period of 1991-1994. Ukraine had to deal with several challenges: to develop internal and foreign policies, normalize its relations with Russia, and resolve the economic aftereffects of Soviet disintegration. It was vitally important for Ukraine to maintain constructive dialogue with Russia, but Ukraine's prospects in Russia would be better supported through Europe. Taking European approaches and bringing them to Russia (or bringing Russia closer to Europe) seemed to be useful for all parties involved. Ukraine's western aspirations, constrained by Russian influence and the Soviet-type mentality of some leaders, required the support and enhancement of European allies. Improving the economic situation, affected by economic crises, developing the market economy and conducting reforms were also the pressing issues. Establishing relations with NATO was another important step in promoting Ukraine's security considerations. Close economic and political support for Ukraine at that initial moment was an important investment in its own security in the long term.

Ukraine was successful at that time in being recognized as a positive partner and important player in the international realm. Ukraine managed to preserve its integrity and sovereignty as well as avoid ethnic or other conflicts on its territory. Ukraine's political leaders were active and enthusiastic in processing state national interests in the international arena. Ukraine's national interests were also formed during that period, which is represented in corresponding documents. The European and Euro-Atlantic course was believed to be the primary one even at that time. However, the need to maintain friendly relations with Russia constrained active advances in that direction. The

Agreement on Partnership and cooperation with the European Union was concluded with frameworks for NATO cooperation outlined. Bilateral relations with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and others were introduced, basic political agreements were concluded with Romania and Russia, and a Charter on relations with the United States was developed during that time.

The second and third periods of Ukraine's foreign policy development (1994-1998. 1999-2004) coincided with the dynamic developments in Europe and in the world, and at the same time, was characterized by a sort of "inertia" from state officials, which later became the shift towards Russian-oriented policies.

This was the period of EU and NATO enlargements. It was also the period of the growing ambitious empire-oriented policies of Russia, intensified due to the introduction of a more authoritarian-type government. Due to Russian policy developments, the western vector of integration became more attractive for Ukraine in terms of its economy, security, freedom and democratic values. The Charter on distinctive partnership with NATO was signed. Ukraine still actively tried to achieve its objectives in international policies. The United States was identified as a strategic partner of Ukraine, and in response, Ukraine received a sort of political "advance payment" from the United States. The National Defense and Security Council made a corresponding decision regarding NATO and EU strategic long-run integration in May 2002. Since that time, Ukraine actively participated in the war against terror, allowing for over flights, air refueling, and emergency landing for operation Enduring Freedom, and contributing to the largest non-NATO military contingent to Iraq.

At the same time, relations with the Russia-dominated domain were intensified by the agreement of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to establish the Euro-Asian Economic Partnership. Ukraine agreed on participation in economic issues only, rejecting the possibilities of any military of supra-national (eventually Russia-led) institutions to be formed. This decision of the President of Ukraine came as a surprise to Parliamentarians as well as to supporters of Ukraine abroad. Despite the previous declarations and activities, this was also a moment of undermining the European vector in Ukraine. Growing oligarch's influence and communist's activities in Parliament, and increased

anti-Ukrainian feelings in Russia followed enhanced Russia-affiliated policies in Ukraine. At this time, Leonid Kuchma was reelected President. Authoritarian-type powers increased the authority of the Presidential administration in all issues of state activities, which led to abuses of human rights, several scandals and decreasing confidence and trust in Ukraine by its foreign partners.

The new period of Ukrainian foreign and security policy started with the changes in the government of Ukraine in November-December 2004, which restored the preconditions for the successful (or at least active) advance in the Western-integration direction. The revolutionary break with the past, as one of the requirements for democratic development, occurred. One of the serious challenges for the government at present is to find a balanced policy, allowing for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and at the same time, maintaining non-dominating real partnership relations with Russia. Active domestic reforms, directed towards fighting corruption, oligarchic influences, and the violation of human rights are promised and are currently beginning to be fulfilled gradually. The introduction of European democracies norms and values, the development of a real market economy, the integration into the world economy, an increase in the standard of living became the primary goal for the success of diplomats. The military component of the effort is to ensure a proper security environment as well as to contribute to the positive image of Ukraine in the international arena as a reliable and capable partner for peacekeeping, disaster-relief and even security activities.

The first and perhaps one of the most important preconditions for Ukraine's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community is the will and drive from both the leaders and population of Ukraine, namely to become part of Europe and the trans-Atlantic club. Security assurances and nuclear security are among some advantages of that step, as well as an increase in trust and an investing environment in Ukraine. NATO membership would provide additional access for Ukrainians to their European and Atlantic counterparts. Defined external security would allow for concentrating additional efforts on the issues of interior political stability. There are unresolved issues with popular concerns regarding NATO membership. However, a certain level of political decisiveness is then achieved.

It is not enough for Ukraine simply to declare or restate its Euro-Atlantic ambitions. This is the moment for implementing difficult reforms and making foreign policy decisions to align Ukraine with the West that involves real costs and risks.

In order to ensure stable successes in the reform process and prevent shifts from the western vector, NATO and EU membership should become a “golden carrot”, stipulating the country in its efforts to fix an array of problems and issues. Thus, the respective signals, policies and assistance from both the EU and NATO are expected. Ukraine is different from the other Central and Eastern European nations. It can become a bridge between Europe and Asia, or it can be diverted by Russian-led Asian enticements. There is a need for the West to create the kind of clear perspective for Ukraine ultimately to become a member of international institutions such as NATO and the EU, and thus, help the nation to motivate itself.

The new period has only started. Both Ukraine and the West have much to accomplish. Both Ukraine and the West need each other but Ukraine needs it even more. The fortune of Ukraine depends on it. However, the West still can do much to adjust it.

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